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Abstract 
Edward Heath’s political career and ideologies were dominated from an early age on by Europe and 
later a possible British entry into the European Community. When he became Prime Minister he 
therefore did everything he could to accomplish British entry into the EC and succeeded. 1973 was 
the year in which Britain formally joined the EC, but it was also the year chosen by Henry Kissinger as 
the year in which America diverted a lot of their focus to the European continent to reinforce and 
reinvigorate the old Atlantic Alliance between the two continents. To accomplish this, the Americans 
started an initiative which they named the Year of Europe. This initiative would fail spectacularly; not 
only was the preparation that went into it from the American side insufficient, but Europeans were 
found to be largely uninterested in the initiative as well. Rather, they were busy with British entry 
into the EC and the redefinition of their new enlarged community. This left Heath in a pivotal position 
with regards to both intra-European and Atlantic relations, the latter because of the historically good 
relations between Britain and the Americans they were seen as their first liaison between America 
and Europe. This thesis will show that because Edward Heath had such a preference for a strong 
Europe and thus chose to give less attention to the relationship with the Americans the initiative 
would accomplish much less than it would have if there had been a more traditional Atlanticist 
Prime-Minister. In doing so this thesis will not only give an overview of the Year of Europe initiative 
from a British point of view, but also will reflect on the large role a small number of individuals can 
play in the formation of policy that would affect so many.  
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Introduction 
 
1973: the Year of Europe. An American initiative that was intended to reinvigorate, redefine and 
maybe even reboot the Atlantic Alliance. The Alliance had been weakening since its heyday, the 
period immediately following the Second World War. In that period the powers in America and 
Western Europe were so closely intertwined due to the newly formed NATO and American economic 
support for the Europeans through the Marshall plan that at that time there was no question they 
would ever become rivals. But times had changed since then; Europe had grown in many respects, 
most importantly economically and politically, and they were now starting to rival America. 
Therefore the Year of Europe was launched, a brainchild of the one person that eclipsed Richard 
Nixon on the platform of foreign policy during 1973, Henry Alfred Kissinger. It was supposed to lead 
to a new Atlantic Charter that would tie the Atlantic Community together again, for years to come. 
The fact that this initiative failed to deliver any of its promises so spectacularly, and the spectacular 
manner in which it failed – with much bickering between the Europeans and the Americans –, makes 
this a very interesting topic for research. Why did the initiative fail in this way?  
Structure 
The American perspective, however, is only part of the topic for this thesis. Because there 
has been sufficient research into the American perspective on this initiative, not in the least because 
of Kissinger’s own very extensive autobiography, I’ve chosen a different approach, one that has been 
coming in vogue in the last two years and is therefore very interesting to research: the British 
perspective on this initiative, and the way their ‘special relationship’ was of importance for their 
view. To narrow down my approach, I’ve chosen to focus mainly on the British Prime-Minister during 
the biggest part of the Year of Europe, Edward Heath. I chose this approach because all though the 
bigger English perspective has been thoroughly discussed in Catherine Hynes’ analysis of the Year of 
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Europe1, it’s still interesting to see how personal relationships affected the grander scale of 
international politics. For example, Douglas-Home, Secretary of the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office in Heath’s Cabinet, had a more positive view of the Anglo-American relations than his Prime-
Minister, while being less interested in Europe and Britain’s entry into the EEC. Therefore, as Niklas 
Rossbach puts it: “It probably suited Home that European integration was Heath’s domain.”2 This 
indicates that, had it been the other way around, with Home being Prime Minister and Heath being 
Foreign Secretary, the international relations would have been laid out in a completely different 
manner during this period. Therefore, research into Heath’s own ideas and his personal impact on 
the way this initiative was handled is not only justified, but also very much of interest to historians of 
international relations, especially since Heath’s ideas differed greatly from his predecessors. His 
orientation was aimed more at Europe, and saw the Anglo-American relationship as a “natural” 
relationship, rather than a “special” one. But meanwhile, he did become the one European leader 
that managed to build up a friendly relationship with Nixon, and although it was a somewhat uneven 
balance, Nixon had “enormous admiration” for Heath, while Heath was, of all British political leaders 
“the most indifferent to the American connection.” “He preferred a leading position in Europe to an 
honorary advisory role,” as Kissinger would later describe Heath’s role.3 
To research this particular topic, this thesis will pay attention to multiple subjects, that all are 
equally important in answering the main question that is behind it. That question is “What role did 
Heath personally play during the Year of Europe?” In other words, in what way did Heath personally 
affect the Atlantic relations? To answer that question attention will have to be devoted to both 
Heath and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, where focus on Douglas-Home specifically could 
provide new insights. During Heath’s term in office, the Prime Minister handled more of foreign 
policy than his predecessors, especially on subjects regarding Europe. The Year of Europe proposal 
                                                             
1 Catherine Hynes, The Year That Never Was: Heath, the Nixon Administration and the Year of Europe (Dublin 
2009). 
2
 Niklas H. Rossbach, Heath, Nixon and the Rebirth of the Special Relationship: Britain, the US and the EC, 1969-
74 (Houndmills 2009), p. 25. 
3 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, Toronto 1982), pp. 140-144.  
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will also have to be discussed, and attention has to be paid to Kissinger’s intentions for the initiative. 
This last topic will be the starting point of this thesis; the first chapter will discuss the start by the 
Americans, the launch of the initiative by Henry Kissinger on April 23, 1973. This is an important part, 
because the origins of the initiative are, in my view, of big significance, if only to answer the question 
why the proposals caused so much upheaval in Europe and why the response was the way it was.  
Did Kissinger - by accident or on purpose - play down Europe’s role in the world so much that it 
caused the French President Georges Pompidou to rebut this initiative by announcing publicly that 
“in Europe, every year is the Year of Europe”4? 
As this thesis will focus on Heath’s own ideas and the way those influenced British foreign 
policy, an introduction of Heath’s background will be in order as well. Also the make of his Cabinet 
and of course a short background of Douglas-Home, who would be one of the major foreign policy 
makers for the British during this period, will also be discussed. The following chapters will combine 
the previously discussed topics; they will focus on the British response towards the Year of Europe, 
both immediately following the announcement by Kissinger, but also in the course of 1973. I have 
chosen for a division between the responses and the way it was handled before the Yom Kippur war 
and the handling during and after this war and the following energy crisis. This was done because this 
war came at a point where for the first time both parties seemed to make progress on the initiative; 
however, because of the outbreak of the war, and the difference in ideas between the Americans 
and the British, this progress never amounted to anything substantial. 
Even though Heath left office before the signing of the Ottawa declaration, which was what 
the Year of Europe in the end achieved, I’ve chosen to discuss the period between Heath leaving 
office and the actual signing in a short epilogue, because even though he had left office, he was still 
the one who had set the plans in motion, and for the following cabinet the time was too short to 
actually influence those plans. Interesting to note is that the declaration by this time had turned into 
                                                             
4 Jussi Hanhimäki, The flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford 2004), p. 277. 
7 
 
a NATO document, and there was nothing European about the Year of Europe declaration anymore, 
which can be seen as yet another illustration of the spectacular failure of the Year of Europe.  
Context 
Both of the world-leaders that play the most important roles in this thesis, Nixon and Heath, were 
very much interested in foreign policy, probably more so than any of their predecessors since the 
Second World War. Nixon especially had extensive foreign policy experience. He had been Vice 
President under Eisenhower, had been a member of both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives before that, and afterwards had travelled a lot as a private citizen. This led to “his 
exposure to the world and to foreign leaders [being] near the top among the political figures of his 
time and among twentieth-century candidates for the presidency.”5 His foreign policy experience 
was most likely one of the most important reasons for him being elected, since the late 60s were a 
period of international upheaval, and the United States was caught in the Vietnam war, a war that at 
that period of time still remained inconclusive.  Since the Tet-offensive polls in America had even 
started to show that a majority of Americans now believed that it had been a mistake for the United 
States to get so deeply involved in Indochina.  His previous interest in foreign policy has most likely 
also been one of the decision points of the election in a less obvious manner than before; years after 
he had left office, the full story of how Nixon had led a covert operation to persuade the leader of 
the North-Vietnamese not to enter into peace talks with President Johnson, an act that William 
Bundy calls “the very act that may have tipped the election result in Nixon’s favor.” After being 
elected, he reinforced his image as a foreign policy President in his inaugural address. He even went 
as far as calling it a sacred commitment: “I have taken an oath today in the presence of God and my 
countrymen to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States. To that oath I now add this 
                                                             
5 William P. Bundy, A tangled web: the making of foreign policy in the Nixon presidency (London 1998), p. 4. 
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sacred commitment: I shall consecrate my office, my energies, and all the wisdom I can summon, to 
the cause of peace among nations.”6 
This was a commitment Nixon wished to uphold all throughout his presidency, as he restated 
in his annual report to Congress on foreign policy: “One of my basic goals is to build a new consensus 
of support in the Congress and among the American people for a responsible foreign policy for the 
1970's.”7 However, foreign policy is a very wide and vague subject. Obviously there were other 
pressing matters on the foreign policy front: the war in Vietnam, or the new policy of détente 
towards the Soviet Union to name just two. The question arises where this left Western Europe. Very 
soon in his presidency, he made clear that Western Europe was not one of his main priorities: it only 
came in fifth on his list, trailing behind “East-West relations, policies toward the Soviet Union and 
China, and Eastern Europe,” and even in this fifth place it was only where “NATO is affected and 
where major countries (Britain, Germany and France) are affected.”8 However, by 1973, the stage 
had changed. Nixon, together with Henry Kissinger, had achieved major results, especially in the 
previous year. There had been a major breakthrough in the relations with China; “significant 
agreements” had been made with the Soviet leaders and in January 1973 Vietnamisation had bore its 
first fruits with the Agreement between the North Vietnamese and the Americans. 9 This gave Nixon 
and his administration the chance to refocus their efforts, and to give more attention to Western 
Europe. He seemed to be misremembering his own priorities, formulated just over 3 years prior, 
since at this juncture he claims: for no aspect of U.S. foreign policy commands greater attention and 
care than our relations with Western Europe.”10 Here we also find a statement of intent for the Year 
of Europe, even though he later would have very little to do with it, mainly because of domestic 
concerns, namely Watergate, which diverted his attention elsewhere. “I have referred to 1973 as the 
                                                             
6 Richard Milhous Nixon, “First Inaugural address, Monday, January 20, 1969”, Inaugural addresses of the 
presidents of the United States: from George Washington 1789 to George Bush 1989 (Washington 1989), on: 
http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/P/rn37/speeches/nixon1.htm (consulted on April 12th, 2011). 
7 Richard Nixon, US Foreign Policy for the 1970's: SHAPING A DURABLE PEACE, May 3rd, 1973, p. 2. 
8 Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945 (Oxford 2003), p. 176. 
9 Nixon, Shaping a durable peace, p. 6. 
10 Ibid, p. 42. 
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year of Europe, not because we regarded Europe as less important in the past or because we expect 
to overcome the problems of the Atlantic Community in any single year. This will be a year of Europe 
because changes in the international environment, and particularly in Europe, pose new problems 
and new opportunities.”11 This, however, was the official reasoning behind the Year of Europe. What 
not must be forgotten was that this was also a period of détente, a time in which America had to get 
all wood behind the same arrow; they had to make sure their European allies backed them in 
negotiations, and most of all, would not try and develop a relationship with the USSR on their own. 
This gives us some insight in the American reasoning behind the initiative. Nixon saw himself 
as a President who devoted more than usual attention to foreign affairs, because he thought time 
demanded this of him. After turning towards more urgent matters elsewhere on the planet, he 
turned towards more abstract concepts, such as the redefinition of the Atlantic relations, which by 
this moment, had stooped to an all-time low. This is where Nixon and Kissinger’s year of Europe 
comes into play. 
Relevance 
When writing history, it is of course important to choose a topic wisely. A topic is regarded as 
important when it bears any relevance to either today’s world or to further the field of history itself. 
Seeing as my topic is one that has occurred in recent history, and is very much in vogue at the 
moment, it is easy to claim that it exists to shine a light on a topic that has featured in the already 
published works, but has not as well been lit out as other parts, such as the French perspective on 
the Year of Europe, or Kissinger’s thoughts on transatlantic relations.  
Of course, biographies of Heath have been written, and he himself has published an 
autobiography. And in recent years, the interest for the Year of Europe has been bigger than ever 
before. However, none of these works have set out to combine the two. I feel that the impact of 
Heath on the Year of Europe in his biographies has been overshadowed by other domestic and 
                                                             
11 Ibid. 
10 
 
international issues, while his backgrounds and ideology rarely plays a role in works that focus on the 
Year of Europe. For example, Daniel Möckli in his otherwise excellent article on the Year of Europe 
from an international perspective, talks about the unique constellation of personalities leading 
Europe, where he mentions “British Prime Minister Edward Heath was an ardent supporter of a 
European Foreign Policy”12, but never do the background and circumstances that led to Heath 
becoming a supporter of a European Foreign Policy play any role. And this is true for all other works 
I’ve encountered  during my research for this thesis.13 This thesis will try and address this problem: it 
will look at the roots of Heath’s ideas and look at how they developed and how they would later 
influence him in his decisionmaking during the Year of Europe.  
Source Material 
The material for this research will have to come from multiple sources. To get backgrounds on Heath, 
and for a lesser extent Henry Kissinger, both their autobiographies and biographies written by others 
will be consulted. However, these ordinarily don’t give a lot of insight into their policies affecting the 
Year of Europe, because most of their biographies are over 10 years old. And in that period, as stated 
before, the interest for the Year of Europe was at a low. Kissinger’s autobiography, written in the 80s, 
however, does pay a lot of attention the initiative, which illustrates the way this subject had fallen off 
the radar after that time and has only just resurfaced. So, to complement these sources, my research 
will also draw from the more recent books and articles published on the Edward Heath’s foreign 
policy. Since his time in office has not been a long one, these books are a good and concise source on 
the foreign policy conducted by the Heath government. 
                                                             
12 Daniel Möckli, ‘Asserting Europe’s Distinct Identity: The EC Nine and Kissinger’s Year of Europe’ in: Matthias 
Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz (eds.), The Strained Alliance: U.S.-European Relations From Nixon To Carter 
(New York 2010), pp.195-220, there p.196. 
13 See for example Catherine Hyne’s earlier quoted work or Alistair Noble, ‘Kissinger’s Year of Europe, Britian’s 
Year of Choice’, in: Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz (eds.), The Strained Alliance: U.S.-European 
Relations From Nixon To Carter (New York 2010), pp.221-235. 
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 Naturally, the most extensive research will be done in primary source material. This will have 
to come from multiple sources. For the American part of the initiative, and their reasoning, material 
will have to come from the Disclosed Documents and National Security Archives located at the 
Roosevelt Centre14. Also the University of California’s American Presidency project will provide 
sources, relating to both Nixon and Kissinger15. For the British perspective, sources will come from 
Keith Hamilton and Patrick Salmon’s excellent collection of Document on British Foreign Policy 
Overseas. This collection, which has been issued by the Foreign and Commonwealth office, provides 
researchers with electronic versions of the documents issued by the government in a certain period, 
of which Series III, Volume IV – The Year of Europe: America, Europe and the Energy Crisis 1972-1974 
– is obviously the most important one for this thesis. 
 Combining these sources in an all-encompassing picture of the period is not an easy task, 
especially when realizing this is a thesis mainly focusing on a person, and therefore actions might not 
be as rational as when one studies, say, a government or group of people. However, it is important 
that this period be studied in depth and the major players in this period get the attention they 
deserve, especially on topics that might not have been so interesting for researchers to spend time 
on. The relationship between the United States and Great Britain has been very important for both 
countries during the twentieth century and continues to be so until this day. A period in which this 
relationship might have been at a low is therefore worthy of our interest and deserves to be 
researched. 
  
                                                             
14 All sources that sources that came from either of these archives (Disclosed Documents, National Security 
Archives) will have come from the library at the Roosevelt Centre, unless stated otherwise. 
15 American Presidency Project, located on http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/index.php.  
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Chapter 1: The making of Edward Heath 
 
John Campbell starts his biography of Edward Heath with the sentence “Geography, class and family 
made Ted Heath what he is”16, an opinion that most his biographers share. Edward Heath was not 
born into your average tory family, and his childhood was not what you would expect of the leader of 
the Conservative Party halfway through the twentieth century.  This chapter will paint a picture of 
Edward Heath’s life until 1973, to show how his ideas on the relation between Britain and the 
continent were formed, how he got to be the proponent of British integration in Europe. If Edward 
Heath has made one lasting impression in history, it probably is his pro-Europe stance, which lasted 
throughout his political career, and only seems to have grown stronger. Therefore, it is relevant for 
this chapter to start research into his political ideas and especially his vision for British future from 
the start of his life, because his view on Europe was not formed overnight, and there are a lot of 
factors influencing this pro-European integration view he later got so famous for.  
Childhood, Oxford and the War (1916-1946) 
Growing up in Kent, Heath was a part of a socially mobile family, where his dad went from being a 
carpenter to employing several people as a builder. This social advancement is something of pride for 
Heath; several of his biographers mention his plan to sue the Oxford student magazine Isis for 
describing his father as ‘a jobbing builder’. Heath never denied this, only corrected the matter by 
mentioning that it was the Sunday Express which had used the phrase.17 This social movement was 
what started the conservative element in Heath’s life, due to his father’s influence.18 Heath first got 
into politics during his term at Oxford, where he joined the Oxford Union and also joined all three 
                                                             
16 John Campbell, Edward Heath: A Biography (London 1993), p. 3. 
17 Ibid, p.18; Philip Ziegler, Edward Heath: The Authorized Biography (London 2010), p.3; Andrew Roth, Heath 
and the Heathmen (London 1972), p. 13. Interesting to note is that this last source attributes the quote to yet 
another paper, the Daily Express. 
18 Campbell, Edward Heath, p. 6. 
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(Conservative, Labour, and Liberal) political societies, which was “quite normal” for a student at that 
time.19 He joined just “to see what they were up to”20 and to hear their main speakers, because by 
then he had already decided that “a moderate form of Conservatism offered the best foundation for 
a free society” even though he “deplored the snobbishness of many Conservatives, as well as the 
envy and hatred of the party which were the consequence of it.”21 
Heath took a little longer than usual to make his maiden speech for the Union, later claiming 
“he had no desire whatever to make a speech just for the sake of doing so.”22 When he eventually 
did give his maiden speech it was received as “extremely forcible and able,” but it did not establish 
him as a major speaker straight away.23 It was not until a motion by the then chairman of Labour, 
Hugh Dalton, was defeated in the house, much to the convention that visiting celebrities carried the 
day. Heath’s speech against the motion was largely credited with the defeat.24 This oration was a 
main factor in his election to secretary of the Union, only two weeks later. But of course, for a man 
with his ambitions, the ultimate goal was becoming President of the Union, and it was his interest in 
foreign politics that would eventually lead to his election. In the summer of 1937 Heath travelled to 
Nazi Germany. And he even attended, arranged through the German embassy in London, the famed 
Nuremberg rally and afterwards met both Himmler and Goebbels, an obviously extraordinary 
experience for a student25. One summer later, while he still was at Oxford, Heath took another trip to 
the continent, where he again experienced fascism first-hand. He was invited as President of the 
University Conservative Associations to experience the Spanish civil war in Catalonia, where he met 
with several government dignitaries, including the Spanish Prime Minister, Juan Negrin. After 
returning to Britain, nearly getting shot down on leaving Madrid, he was already “convinced that the 
                                                             
19 Edward Heath, The Course of My Life: My Autobiography (London 1998), p. 29. 
20 Roth, Heath and the Heathmen, pp. 29-31. 
21 Heath, The Course of My Life, p. 29. 
22
 Ibid, p. 30 
23 Ziegler, Edward Heath, p. 26. 
24 Ibid; Campbell, Edward Heath, pp. 27-28. 
25 Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
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Spanish civil war was merely the preamble to a greater European war.”26 Having experienced this, 
Heath finally lost his confidence in Chamberlain’s National Government, especially after it had closed 
the Munich Pact, which permitted Germany to annex Sudetenland. Opposing the National 
Government during the Presidential Debates in the Union is the position that most people regard as 
having won him the Presidency. The next summer, 1939, was the last one of Heath’s long journeys to 
the Continent for a while. He travelled with a half-Jewish friend to Warsaw, where they left just 
before the Germans invaded. Heath got back to the United Kingdom via Paris, returning on the 1st of 
September, the same day that Hitler invaded Poland, two days before the British declared war on the 
Germans.27 
After the declaration of war, Heath immediately went to the University Recruitment Board in 
Oxford and got allocated to the Royal Artillery, but was also told that he wouldn’t be required for 
several months. This allowed him to take yet another tour abroad: a tour of American universities on 
a debating excursion. Before this tour the Foreign Office had warned him to stay off the subject of 
the war, as not to offend the neutrality of the Americans, but he soon found out that it was all the 
Americans wanted to talk about. On one of these occasions he presented a view on the future of 
Europe after the war that seemed to foreshadow his later positions on Europe: “the best hope was a 
federal Europe, a ‘United States of Europe… in which states will have to give up some of their 
national rights … There seems to be a better view for the future if we lean towards a federalism that 
can be secured either by joining with a small national group and/or big group, because this seems to 
be the most fool proof sort of thing you can get’”28. And even though many aspects of American life 
appealed to him, this visit would not make the same kind of mark on his life as his visits to Europe 
did, and neither would it “diminish the primary commitment he instinctively felt to Europe.”29 In his 
own memoirs, Heath appears to have nothing but fond memories from his trip to the United States. 
                                                             
26
 Ibid, pp. 32-33; Ziegler, Edward Heath, pp. 30-31. 
27 Campbell, Edward Heath, pp. 38-39; Roth, Heath and the Heathmen, pp. 40-41. 
28 As quoted in Ziegler, Edward Heath, p. 40. 
29 Campbell, Edward Heath, p. 41. 
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New York, especially, seems to have made a good impression on him; it was “quite irresistible to a 
young man such as myself”30. John Campbell even goes as far as thinking that “the memory of his 
visit may possibly have helped counteract the latent anti-Americanism to which in later life he was 
increasingly prone.”31 He did however gain some insight in American policies that would later 
influence his own government style. Socialism combined with government control would become 
“national socialism and political control too often follows.” Deficit spending, like the American New 
Deal, might be risky but at least “would offer the possibility of a fruitful advance.”32 
After returning, Heath at last made it into the army. He was made a 2nd Lieutenant in the 335 
Battery, but was promoted within one year into the Commanding Officer’s Adjutant, and got 
promoted to the rank of Captain. His tour of duty took him through France, the Netherlands, Belgium 
and into Germany, tying Heath even closer to the European continent. Returning home in 1946, he 
had to figure out his future. Studying to take the bar, as he had initially planned, was not really an 
option anymore, since he had already turned 30. And so he came to work in the civil service, while at 
the same time trying to get elected to the House of Commons.33 
Starting a life in politics 
Heath won his first seat in the 1950 General Election in the constituency of Bexley. Situated in Kent, 
but not in a rural area and conveniently located on the route from London to the house of his 
parents, this was seen by Heath as a nearly perfect seat. And even though he only won it with a 
majority of 133, it was the seat he’d remain loyal to his entire political career, even when he  became 
leader of the Conservative party and much safer seats were offered to him. 34  
                                                             
30 Heath, The Course of My Life, p. 74. 
31
 Campbell, Edward Heath, p. 42. 
32 Ziegler, Edward Heath, p. 41. 
33 Roth, Heath and the Heathmen, pp. 47-57. 
34 Campbell, Edward Heath, pp. 62-70. 
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 During his first summer recess Heath again travelled to the continent. He journeyed to 
Western Germany, where he met with several members of the Bundestag. He found them “buzzing 
with excitement about what was already being called the ‘Schuman Plan’.” This arrangement, which 
in many respects can be seen as the plan that started the process of European integration which 
would lead to the eventual European Union, called for a supranational authority that oversaw the 
steel and coal industries in France and Germany, and any other Western European country which 
would want to join. Reflecting back on this he would later write the following about the European 
question in Europe: “the raison d’être of the European Union is political, to integrate Germany into 
Europe.”35 The impressions these meetings made on him and the tempo in which the country was 
being rebuilt left him staggered. Through these meetings his link to the continent and his support of 
European integration only grew stronger. It therefore is not strange that he chose this topic, the 
Schuman plan and its implications, for his maiden speech in parliament.36 Even though the current 
Labour government had refused to join in the talks on the Schuman plan, Heath implored them “to 
go into the Schuman plan to develop Europe and to co-ordinate it in the way suggested.”37 And even 
though at this moment “he knew he was swimming against the tide, Heath never ceased to press the 
European cause when any opportunity arose.”38  
 However, it was not his stance on Europe, but the liberal aspect of his political views with 
which he made an impression within the party. He grew up in a family of humble means, and was a 
big supporter of the One Nation39 ideal that rose up during this period. The attention this gained 
Heath was one of the main reasons that led to him being invited to become one of the Tory Whips. 
The invitation posed a difficult decision for him: being one of the Whips would make him one of the 
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more important members of the party, boosting him ahead of the Tories of his generation, but the 
Whips office was also one that rarely offered any real promotions, it was not common for a Whip to 
get promoted to a ministerial position. However, he took up the position, and it proved to be a good 
decision. Due to this work he gained valuable insights on his colleagues in the parliament, and he 
enjoyed it as well. And after the 1954 elections, which the Tories won, the post of Chief Whip 
became vacant. As the new Prime Minister Anthony Eden would later tell Heath’s biographer: “Ted 
Heath took over as Chief Whip; by what seemed a natural process.”40 
Member of the Cabinet 
Even though the Chief Whip was not a formal member of the Cabinet, during Heath’s period in office 
the post became more and more regarded as one. Anthony Eden regarded him in such a manner that 
he had Heath present at Cabinet meetings41. And Heath did not see this as a special reward, “Heath 
was present at almost every meeting and increasingly behaved as if he belonged there as of right.”42 
This was a precedent that Prime Ministers from then on have followed.  
One of the most important events that occurred during his period as Chief Whip was the Suez 
crisis, starting with the sudden Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal nine months after Heath 
started in his new function. During this crisis, Heath played a huge role in getting the government 
through the calamity; “Had it not been for the quiet skill with which Edward Heath and his colleagues 
in the Whip’s office handled the parliamentary party throughout the crisis, the situation might well 
become desperate” Lord Chancellor Kilmuir would later express his view on the situation.43 He 
managed to get the party into line on the vital vote on retreat from the Canal, and by doing so made 
sure the Government or the Pound Sterling did not get threatened. The Economist summarized the 
way Heath handled the crisis as follows: “Mr Heath will have surely earned a niche in the Tory 
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pantheon as the man who gave the party as second chance.”44 The crisis did however cause Prime 
Minister Eden to resign, and his successor was Heath’s favourite, Harold Macmillan. “Working with 
him gave great pleasure as well as broadenings one’s life” was just one of the warm descriptions of 
Macmillan Heath would later write in his autobiography.45 And Macmillan felt affectionately about 
Heath as well, something which greatly influenced Heath’s sway in the party. “Heath is probably the 
most influential man around the Prime Minister today” an unidentified minister said in 1958.46 This 
authority led to Heath becoming more and more of a key-player in the party, and it came as no 
surprise that Heath after the 1959 got a post as Minister of Labour, “it was only right… that he should 
step into independent ministerial command.”47  
First EC neogtiations. 
However, his stay at Labour was only short-lived. Only nine months after taking up the office, 
he was asked by Macmillan to become the second man at the Foreign Office, after Lord Home. This 
did mean Heath would no longer have his own department, but it also had its benefits. He now was 
Lord Privy Seal, and the relations with Europe fell also under his responsibilities. This appointment 
led Heath to find “his life’s cause.”48 Although Heath had taken an interest in British relations with 
the continent before, it was this appointment that really tied the two together. This post would 
eventually put him in charge of the discussions on Britain’s negotiations with the EC49 on a possible 
entry. The reasoning Macmillan had for putting Heath in charge of this has remained unclear until 
this day. John Campbell claims in his biography of Heath that it was in the end this job that spurred 
                                                             
44 As quoted in Ibid, p. 97. 
45 Heath, Course of My Life, p.182. 
46 Ziegler, Edward Heath, p. 106. 
47 As quoted in Ibid., p. 111. 
48 Roth, Heath and the Heathmen, p. 112. 
49 Even though it is sometimes referred to as the EEC, the British application was actually to the EC, which 
meant all three of the European Communities (EEC, EURATOM, ECSC). Confusion nowadays arises due to the 
renaming of the EEC into EC after the EU had been established in 1993. But in the period of time this thesis is 
concerned with, the EEC and EC still had different meanings.  
19 
 
Heath’s vision on Europe, as an “extraneous implant, formed by Macmillan’s disposition of offices in 
1960.”50 However, I concur with Philip Ziegler’s vision that even before this, Heath was “well known 
to be well-disposed towards Europe and critical of the Labour Government’s failure to move towards 
the Common Market.” He might not have been the “Europhile” he became later in his life, but as this 
chapter until now has shown; he already had a close link to the continent, he was very much aware 
that Britain’s future would lie with the continent. But the moment he was put in charge of the 
discussions “what he had always felt would be a most desirable step forward became for him the 
Holy Grail.”51 
However, the relation between Britain and the EC was a difficult one, and the negotiations 
would prove to be very difficult. Heath had not only to mind the British interests, but also that of the 
entire Commonwealth because a British entry into the EC would cause “Commonwealth exports to 
Britain suffer”52. Also there was the issue of the on-going American Presidential elections. The British 
feared that if Nixon had been elected back then, instead of Kennedy, there would have been a focus 
on France within the American government, instead of the pro-British approach of Kennedy. 
Ironically enough Nixon was of course the President who later would attempt to re-strengthen the 
American-British relations, only to find Heath as Prime Minister more interested in France (and the 
rest of Western Europe). But Macmillan had made the decision to apply for membership, and Heath 
would try his best to successfully round of the negotiations. As he would later write: “Well aware 
that the United Kingdom, shorn of its Empire and old dependencies, could no longer enjoy its former 
role as a world superpower… we might continue to play an influential world role through 
wholehearted participation in Europe.”53 The rival economic bloc that Britain had formed and had 
come into existence only months before these negotiations began, the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA), was regarded “as a weak organisation and one, moreover, whose progress would 
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always be inhibited by its weakest members.”54 The EC, however, was turning out to be a strong bloc 
in the world, one that Heath thought might play an international role of importance in the future. In 
contrast to many of his countrymen, Heath saw the British Empire as a thing of the past, and to be 
able to play a real role of importance again, he felt they had to join the EC. And the British thought 
they had a good chance of joining; enquiries made by embassies in the Six55 led them to believe that 
they wished the British to join. Heath himself met with the Italian and French governments, and even 
though British membership would pose problems for new initiatives like the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), they seemed positive. 
These preambles took more than a year, and it wasn’t until October 10th, 1961 that the 
negotiations formally began. Immediately structural problems arose: Britain’s negotiations were 
being held with representatives of all six countries, and not with the EC Commission. This led to 
difficulties for British negotiators, because the Six had to first formulate their common position, and 
after that they were “naturally reluctant to reopen matters which had been agreed in order to 
accommodate Britain.”56 And negotiations were sluggish, and drawn out to long talks where 
apparently everything that the Commonwealth could import was subject to debate in the EC. From 
kangaroo meat to banana’s, everything was subject to debate, and more importantly, every time 
Heath made an offer, the Six had to withdraw to agree on a response.57 This slow progress was 
playing right into the hand of the French, who were apparently not as keen on the idea of British 
membership as they had seen to Heath at first. And eventually, it was the French, by the hand of 
their President, who killed the British application to the EC. He vetoed the British entry and therefore 
ended the entire application process in one go. This happened on January 14th, 1962, a day which 
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would be “one of the worst days in *Heath’s+ life.” 58 However, Heath insisted “Britain should 
maintain its constructive engagement with, and influence in, Europe despite de Gaulle’s veto.”59   The 
way Heath kept his composure after such a setback was impressive, after all “his career seemed 
ruined too.”60 Since the five other countries in the EC had actually been constructive towards British 
entry, Heath felt that maintaining a relation with them while at the same time trying to convince de 
Gaulle to drop his veto would eventually lead Britain into the EC. De Gaulle in 1965 would tell Heath 
“If you become Prime Minister, you will be the man who will lead Britain into the European 
Community.”61 This was a prediction which would become true nearly a decade later. 
During the next Cabinet reshuffle, which would make Alec Douglas-Home Prime Minister, 
Heath obtained yet another post; he now became Secretary of State for Industry, Trade and Regional 
Development. His stay at this department was not long though, the Conservatives lost their majority 
during the next elections and Heath was now just another member of the House of Commons, albeit 
one that (shortly) held the post of Shadow Chancellor.62 But these elections also spelled the end for 
Douglas-Home’s leadership of the Conservative party, and in the leadership elections that followed 
Heath became leader of the Conservative party. 
From leader of the Tories to leader of the Country. 
Heath’s period as leader of the Opposition seems to have contributed very little to his views on 
Europe. As he needed to improve his image with the British public, he focussed on domestic affairs. 
But since his direct opponent in the Commons, Prime-Minister Harold Wilson, outshone him on 
nearly every occasion, his biggest publicity boosts came from activities outside Parliament, such as 
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winning the Sydney to Hobart Ocean Sailing race.63 However, during his period in the opposition 
French President de Gaulle – who had vetoed a British application for an EC membership again in 
1967 - resigned in 1969, which made a British entry into the EC a very real possibility again. His 
successor, Georges Pompidou, was better disposed towards the idea of a British entry, but also felt 
that this had more chance of succeeding during a period of Tory leadership. And even though he 
knew the British public and many of the Tory MP’s were against British membership, Heath felt 
Britain belonged in the EC and in the future, eventually in a unified Europe. “Whilst the European 
countries concerned were moving on from the nation state because in their view it was inadequate 
to meet modern requirements, the British were still thinking in terms of the power which they had 
previously exercised and which they believed still belonged to them.”64 And this was exactly what he 
would set out to accomplish during his time as Prime Minister. In the next elections the Tories would 
gain the majority again – against all predictions – and Heath became the first real pro-European 
integration Prime Minister Britain would have. 
Prime-Minister Heath and his Cabinet 
After taking over 10 Downing Street on June 19th, 1970, Heath’s first concern was that of creating a 
Cabinet. Especially the position of Foreign Secretary would be an important one, bearing in mind 
Heath’s vision on the future of Britain. The rest of his appointments were either predictable 
appointments of senior party-members or promotions of those that had been loyal to him. This 
disposition of his towards providing opportunity for “loyal ‘meritocrats’” was shown by the way he 
excluded those able men who had crossed him in some way or another. 65 Former Prime Minister 
Home, the man who Heath had replaced as leader of the Conservative party, had also remained loyal 
to his successor and was appointed as Foreign Secretary. Their views might have differed on crucial 
                                                             
63 Ziegler, Edward Heath, pp. 161-189. 
64
 As quoted in Niklas H. Rossbach, Heath, Nixon and the Rebirth of the Special Relationship: Britain, the US and 
the EC, 1969-1974, p. 19. 
65 Roth, Heath and the Heathmen, p. 211 
23 
 
issues such as the relations between Europe and America, but “Heath counted on Home’s loyalty to 
surpass any doubts.”66 And indeed, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) under Home was 
very compatible with Heath’s ideas. Heath and the FCO both followed the line of thought set out by 
President Kennedy in the 60s: the relationship between Europe and America should be a strong one, 
but “a union in Europe was ‘still the first order of business for the Europeans.” American support for 
British entry in the EC was necessary to allow for smooth access. If anything, the difference was that 
the FCO focussed mainly on the entry into the office, while Heath also prepared for the time 
following this.67 
 However, things had changed since 1963. In 1963 Britain was still very competitive compared 
to the EC, but in 1970 there was a pervasive fear of decline, since the EC countries seemed to be in a 
phase of economic growth, while the UK lagged behind. This led to what Niklas Rossbach calls a 
“now-or-never approach,” they felt Britain had to join the EC before the differences between them 
and the EC countries grew too big.68 So Britain had to make work of its application, and Heath was 
the man at the right time and place to do it. As often has been said, the key to British entry into the 
EC would lie with the French. Therefore most negotiations were undertaken with Pompidou, but also 
with the French Secretary-General, Michel Jobert, whom Heath met on his first rounds of 
negotiations in 1963 and who had been sympathetic towards British entry. He would support British 
entry from inside the Elysée and assured Pompidou that Heath was a reliable man.69 But not only the 
Six had to be convinced, Heath also had to convince the House of Commons that accession was in the 
best interest of Britain and the British people. This was probably harder for Heath then convincing 
Pompidou. Pompidou and Heath met, in private, with only two translators present, on the 21st and 
22nd of May, 1971, and during these meetings Heath managed to convince Pompidou of his reasoning 
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for joining, that Britain actually wanted to become “European,” and did not want “to enter the 
Community only so as to destroy it or to divert it from its objectives.”70  
 In 1971, the debate finally kicked off on the floor of the House, where no one could be sure 
about the final vote. There was a group of Labour MP’s who were very pro-Europe, “they strongly 
believed that Britain belonged in Europe and were not prepared to jeopardise their country’s future 
for the sake of partisan advantage.”71 But on the other hand the Conservative party also contained a 
bunch of hardened Eurosceptics, MP’s who strongly believed Britain was better off outside of the EC. 
This led to a somewhat confusion situation, where even the Whips of both parties could not predict 
the outcome of the final vote. Predictions became even harder when Heath decided to give the Tory 
MP’s a free-vote, instead of his earlier comments about “the government using its majority in the 
Commons to carry *the vote+ through”72. And during the debates in October, the longest debate since 
the war, Chancellor of the Exchequer Anthony Barber announced the government would resign 
would the vote not pass, which increased tensions even more. Heath himself gave the closing speech 
in the debate where he stated this was probably the last chance Britain would have for many years to 
join “an United Europe.” He pointed out that China would become within the foreseeable future the 
third superpower in the world, and Britain needed Europe, because “the strength of this country 
alone is not enough to ensure a sensible or satisfactory outcome to the monetary and trading 
discussions.” And the prospect of joining was “the opportunity of joining the Community and of 
influencing one of the major economic Powers.” which he thought the EC would become. These were 
the major points in his speech, one that outlined his own vision for Europe and British future.73 In the 
end the vote was won by the government by a 112 majority, even though only 1/3rd of the British 
population had declared to be in favour of the entry, and half were opposed. Heath’s free vote 
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strategy had worked.74 Congratulations came in from most of European countries, with Pompidou 
hailing it as “a personal success for you *Heath+ and a success for Europe.” This is moment is what 
Heath later regarded as “his greatest success as Prime Minister.” This is what he saw as the start of 
the creation of “one world at peace.”75 
 During this period Heath was also seen to be growing closer and fonder towards the 
Europeans while the Anglo-American relations seemed to cool. Especially towards the French Heath 
was more than courteous, agreeing to French terms on the cost of the Concorde and planning a state 
visit of Queen Elizabeth to France in 1972. At the same time the relations with Washington cooled, 
due to big differences between the British and Americans on the Indo-Pakistani conflict at the end of 
1971. The British sided with the Indians, and the Americans - under the influence of Kissinger - did 
not directly side with the Pakistanis but did act very anti-Indian. Besides this, there was also the 
question of dollar-devaluations, but reasoning for these will be addressed in the next chapter. For 
now it will suffice to say that because of Heath’s new close relations to the French, their responses to 
the American actions were very much alike. As one senior French official was quoted “it would not 
really have made much difference which of them spoke first.”76  
 These close relations with the continent were established firmly on January 22nd, 1972, when 
Heath flew into Brussels to sign the Treaty of Accession. This was not final however; the treaty still 
had to pass the House of Commons. For it to pass the House it would take a long floor fight: it wasn’t 
until the 13th of July after 173 hours of debate that the third reading finally passed. And according to 
his contemporaries, there was no way it ever would have happened without Edward Heath’s 
persistence, it was an achievement which could largely - if not completely - be attributed to him. As 
one of his Cabinet ministers, Jim Prior, would later write “No one other than Ted would have taken 
Britain into Europe.”77 And there was work to be done for Europe. One of the main objectives Heath 
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would have in the next years was the establishment of a regional policy for the EC, with the goal to 
reinvigorate old industrial areas in the same way the CAP supported European farmers. Even though 
this was met with protests by the French, the rest of the nine78 either supported Heath on this policy 
or kept quiet. One other big issue that was widely discussed during this period was further economic 
cooperation, something which would finally culminate in a European Monetary Union (EMU). The 
Bank of England supported such a plan, releasing a statement saying that the EMU would allow 
Europe “to stand up to the economic might of the United States and thus command for itself a more 
powerful voice in world affairs.”79 This was obviously right up Heath’s ally, since his vision of a strong 
united Europe would demand such drastic measures. But he realised the country was not really ready 
for such drastic measures, and therefore said as little as possible about it, even after Nixon’s dollar 
devaluations. He did however promise “total support for Franco-German efforts to stabilise 
European currencies.” As Pompidou would tell Brandt, “Britain was eager to express opinions about 
Europe’s future, but left the detailed issues of economic integration to France and Germany.”80 So 
when Britain formally joined on January 1st, 1973, Heath had not yet been able to make a big mark on 
Europe, but did send a clear signal about his intentions towards both Europe and the rest of the 
world, signalling that Europe would come first. 
Conclusion: Heath and Europe 
Having seen Heath’s life up until the Year of Europe, there seem to be multiple reasons for Heath’s 
more than average interest in the continent, which could all be seen as influences in his policy 
making and his foreign policy strategy. From his college years onwards, he seems to have expressed a 
lot of interest in Europe, making several journeys to the continent. His vision of a united Europe also 
seems to be rooted in this period, a time in which he experienced the rise of fascism first-hand in 
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both Germany and Spain. His experiences during the Second World War only seem to have 
reinforced his thoughts on the subject. These thoughts made him a strong supporter of a closer 
Europe, one so integrated and so closely interdependent that there never could be war again. His 
maiden speech in the House of Commons, showing him to be a strong supporter of the Schumann 
plan, can be seen as his first political act in support of this vision. 
 Besides the prevention of a new World War, European integration was for Heath a way to 
make sure Europe would play a role of importance on the world stage again. And Heath saw that this 
was the time for Britain to join Europe. Immediately after World War 2 Britain still saw itself as a 
superpower in its own right, they had a big Commonwealth and a very tight relationship with the 
United States. But by now these two pillars of British foreign policy were dissolving. The 
Commonwealth had developed into an association of independent countries, but had never 
developed into an effective economic or political bloc. The link with the United States, as will be 
shown in later chapters, had been weakened over many issues in the past decade or so. Therefore, 
Heath saw entry into Europe as the most likely way for Britain to play a role on the world stage once 
more. A politically integrated Europe, in which Britain played a large role, was the way to go. I do not 
think this should be regarded as an anti-American policy, but more as a pro-European policy. This did 
mean the British had to refocus their foreign policy objectives, and had to devote less attention to 
the Americans. This did not go unnoticed in the United States, and with Nixon being a great 
supporter of Heath, this was not something the Americans wished to happen. The way the British as 
well as the rest of the Europeans were less dependent on the Americans in a global context was a 
movement which especially Henry Kissinger hoped to counter. Kissinger still saw the world divided 
into 2 spheres, and if Europe moved away from the American sphere, there was only one way they 
could go: towards the USSR. To counter this, he would launch an initiative known as the Year of 
Europe, which will be discussed in the next chapter, together with a more in depth look at his 
(Kissinger’s) exact reasoning behind it. 
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Chapter 2: American Concerns, the April 23 rd speech and the start of 
the Year of Europe Initiative.  
 
At the start of 1973, the alliance between the Europeans and the Americans was much weaker than 
it once had been. The ties between the continents had diminished a lot since the period during 
World War 2, the time in which the original Atlantic Charter was drafted. This charter, which set out 
the goals for the Allies after the Second World War, had probably run its course. The old empires had 
dissolved and a new economic order had taken place in the world. But this new economic order 
worried the Americans, and especially Henry Kissinger. He felt the old relationship between the 
United States and Europe needed to be solidified, preferably with a new charter, one that echoed the 
old Atlantic Charter. But things had changed since World War 2: America was no longer the world 
superpower and felt its hegemony deteriorating. Europe on the other hand was on the rise, both 
economically and politically. This bothered the United States, since they felt that the relationship 
between the two continents, one that had been so strong, was on the decline, and they were afraid 
of the consequences this would have on a global scale. What if Europe decided to form bi-lateral 
relations with the USSR, because of, for example, the German question, without the United States 
playing a role? This could mean the United States would lose its entire grip on the continent, or so at 
least Kissinger thought. This is why he was convinced of the need of reinforcing the old Atlantic 
Relationship, as a way for the United States to prevent losing its grip on the European continent. This 
chapter will look in depth at the American concerns and the way Kissinger started his attempt to 
refortify the Atlantic Relationship with the Year of Europe. 
Henry Alfred Kissinger  
The principal architect of the Year of Europe initiative was not Richard Nixon himself, but his National 
Security Advisor, Henry Alfred Kissinger. The idea might have come from Nixon, but he became more 
and more preoccupied with other concerns, both international and domestic. The most striking 
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example of this is of course was the Watergate scandal that came into full view during 1973. This led 
to Kissinger having to take over more and more of Nixon’s foreign policy responsibilities, especially 
since he got appointed to the post of Secretary of State in September 1973. From then on he would 
hold both the posts of National Security Advisor as that of Secretary of State, two positions that 
combined to give him unprecedented influence on the foreign policy front. Nixon’s domestic 
problems surrounding the Watergate scandal were so severe that for the Washington Post, 
“Everything, including the Year of Europe and all foreign policy, was secondary to Nixon’s ‘revealing 
the whole truth’.” This was written in the Washington Post of April 26th, 1973; only 3 days after 
Kissinger made the official announcement of the Year of Europe initiative and the coming attempts 
to restore transatlantic relations. 81 Therefore this chapter will focus on Kissinger for most of the 
ideas, even though Nixon was the actual first proponent of America re-establishing relations with its 
European allies. 
Why a year of Europe? 
  This re-establishing of relations with European allies is what Seyom Brown sees as 
one of the most important reasons behind the Year of Europe. He thinks Kissinger called for the Year 
to renew the “disintegrating ‘Atlantic Community’” by calling for what was then still termed the new 
Atlantic Charter.82 Because 1973 was seen, by some contemporaries, as the year in which the 
security community, that had been the foundation for transatlantic relations since the Second World 
War, was fragmenting. The security community was the big umbrella under which all common efforts 
on military terrain were shared. This obviously included NATO, but also the handling of the USSR 
threat in Europe, which was dealt with by the United States mainly. Also the nuclear deterrent was a 
part of this security community, one that without a doubt of massive importance in this period of 
détente. The security community was threatened by the growth of yet another community, the 
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European Economic Community (EEC). The countries involved in the EEC were of course not the same 
as those involved in the NATO, which had been the embodiment of the Atlantic security community, 
and those strains were getting bigger in 1973, when three countries joined the original EEC of six 
members, including the United Kingdom under Heath. And these strains “were prominently exposed 
and crucially affecting relations between the United States and Europe.” Kissinger hoped the Year of 
Europe, and its new Atlantic Charter, would lead to a time in which, as Seyom Brown puts it: “the 
NATO nations would bond together [in times of profound challenge+ to protect Western civilization.” 
83 
Others, such as Richard Thornton, argue that military concerns were at the heart of 
Kissinger’s plans. The balance between east and west had shifted, the world had changed from being 
military dominated by the United States to a bi-polar world, where military power was in balance 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. One might even argue that the balance actually 
favoured the Soviets, since their nuclear capabilities now exceeded that of the United States.84 This 
actually put the Americans for quite a challenge, and especially Kissinger. He was a big proponent of 
the bi-polar world – some have even called his world vision “manically bipolar”85 – and felt it was 
important to keep  “the present world going as long as possible.”86 Therefore Europe should not 
become a third power bloc, and redefine the entire balance Kissinger had put his trust in. This 
balance, however, did lead to the United States having to redefine their strategies and military 
scenarios. The previously adopted plan of massive retaliation, where any hostile military action 
undertaken by the Soviets towards the United States or any of their allies would lead to the United 
States striking back with all they had, was regarded as obsolete in a world the United States no 
longer solely dominated. It was now regarded as “simply inviting mutual suicide.” They now switched 
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to a new strategy of flexible response, with different levels of retaliation; no longer would a military 
response be either all or nothing.87 This policy did require more effort from their European allies who 
were above all required to support these policies economically. As Kissinger put it himself, in his 
speech announcing the Year of Europe initiative: “*the United States expect] from each ally a fair 
share of the common effort for the common defences.”88 As a part of these common efforts, 
American troops were still stationed on European ground, which Europeans feared would be 
withdrawn by the Americans because of domestic issues. These domestic issues surrounding the 
troop-placement in Europe were especially about the cost. And seeing as this happened during a 
period in which the United States congress felt its power had been ‘neutralised’89 by the Presidency 
on military terrain during the Vietnam War, Congressmen seemed to take every opportunity to take 
power back on this front. This in the end would lead to the War Powers Resolution90, as well as plans 
being drafted with regards to troop withdrawal from Europe.  When this would happen, it could lead 
to what Jussi Hanhimäki calls a “European nightmare scenario: what if the Soviet Union decided to 
launch a limited conventional attack in some part of Europe because it could rely on the American 
reluctance not to respond with nuclear weapons?”91 The way American domestic issues had an effect 
on the issue of troop presence in Europe becomes clear from a memo by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, a 
senior staff member of the National Security Council, to Henry Kissinger in regard to the coming 
meeting Kissinger would have with Gaston Thorn, the Luxembourgian Foreign Minister: “He 
understands that we are not linking our troop presence with economic problems but that politically 
they are in fact connected in term of public and congressional attitudes. You should stress this point 
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[emphasis in the original].”92 In this meeting, Kissinger himself raised an issue that could be seen as 
one of the key topics surrounding the launch of the Year of Europe initiative. The initiative was a way 
of raising the Atlantic Alliance to a more philosophical and abstract concept. In the years since the 
Second World War, the Alliance had been watered down to a more technical relationship, one that 
meant that, for Nixon, the Alliance now was “more a matter of the head than of the heart.”93 And 
that was something that had to change. Instead of dabbling about petty disputes on the economic 
front, “what we have to do and what the President wants to do is relate security, politics and 
economics,” since the “economist doesn’t understand the real issues” and “the President cannot be 
expected to conduct soy bean negotiations.”94 But, these economic issues were not as petty as 
Kissinger tried to make them out to be. Economically, the EEC started to rival the United States, and 
the members of the EEC at this point strongly seemed to favour a movement towards economic unity 
in Western Europe and this led to both trade and monetary interests being at stake for the 
Americans. There had been “a sense of rivalry in international monetary relations” and in trade “the 
European nations seemed to be moving toward “a closed trading system embracing the European 
Community and a growing number of other nations in Europe, the Mediterranean and Africa… at the 
expense of the United States and other nations which are excluded.””95 This movement towards 
economic unity came at a bad time for the Americans. Their economy had been in relative decline for 
several years, and they even had to repeal the Bretton Woods system (in which dollars held a fixed 
value versus gold) and devaluate the dollar twice. In 1973, the dollar was worth 17.9% less than it 
had been in December 1971, which lowered prices for American exports. The hope was that these 
devaluations would entice Europeans to import more from the United States,  something the 
Americans felt was being prevented due to the somewhat mercantilist system the EEC was creating 
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for its members. The first devaluation had not been effective – even raising the United States trade 
deficit to $6.8 billion dollars – and the Americans wanted to make sure the second would be 
effective.96  
But one of the most important points has not been yet been raised. Europe was of course a 
pivotal axis in the East/West divides that still split the world at this time. Security measures were one 
of the concerns surrounding this, but there was also the diplomatic front. Growing political 
confidence and regained economic strength in Western Europe had the Americans worried that the 
Europeans might strengthen the diplomatic ties between them and the Soviets. And this would be a 
problem, seeing as the United States had  “no trouble dealing bilaterally with Russia,” but the 
European nations would not be strong enough to “deal bilaterally *with the Soviets+ without having 
the Russians pick them off one by one.97 A National Intelligence Estimate from October 1972 
addressed this as follows: “The Soviet leaders hope that - while maintaining their position in the East 
- they can wean West Europeans away from their close relations with the United States” which 
“would clear the way for the USSR’s emergence as the dominant power on the continent as a 
whole.”98 An example of this new relationship and the American doubts it raised is the issue of West-
German-Ostpolitik after Chancellor Willy Brandt came to power and the Americans feared Germany 
would be driven to some sort of reunification in the end.99 
All these issues were driving the United States and the Western Europeans further and 
further apart. The Americans tried to stop the Europeans from forming a third power bloc in a world 
                                                             
96 Time Magazine, MONEY: The Winners and Losers from Devaluation, February 26th, 1973, consulted on: 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,910593-1,00.html (April 19th, 2011). 
97 David N. Parker, Cabinet Meeting, June 6th, 1973, National Security Files, p. 2. Declassified on: December 
30th, 2002, no. 1760. 
98 National Intelligence Estimate, The USSR and the Changing Scene in Europe, October 26th, 1972, p. 1. 
Declassified by the CIA Historical Review Program on: January 31st, 1994, accesible on: 
http://www.foia.ucia.gov/docs/DOC_0000275225/DOC_0000275225.pdf.  
99 The scope of the German issue is completely outside the scope of this thesis - except for the way it affected 
Western European – American relations -  but there is a plethora of material available on this subject. For a 
discussion of Ostpolitik see for example: Helga Haftendorn, ‘German Ostpolitik in a Multilateral Setting’ in: 
Helga Haftendorn, Georges-Henri Soutou, Stephen F. Szabo and Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Eds.), The Strategic 
Triangle: France, Germany, and the United States in the Shaping of the New Europe (Baltimore 2007), pp. 209-
227. 
34 
 
they preferred to be bi-polar, and a stronger relationship between the Europeans and the Soviets 
was something that had to be stopped at all costs. Even though the Americans claimed they 
supported European integration, in reality it was not in their interests. As Nixon wrote to Kissinger 
early in 1973: “The way the Europeans are talking today, European integration will not be in our 
interest, certainly not from a political viewpoint or from an economic viewpoint.” His memo ended 
with the warning that: “What matters now is what we do and we must act effectively and soon or we 
will create in Europe, a Frankenstein monster, which could prove to be highly detrimental to our 
interests in the years ahead.”100 This is why they tried to reform the Atlantic Alliance with a new 
Atlantic Charter, one that would take care of all previously discussed matters – diplomatic, economic, 
military, etc. – and reform the Alliance that in reality only existed within NATO at that moment.  
The April 23rd speech 
The usual starting point for the Year of Europe initiative is the previously mentioned speech by 
Kissinger. On April 23rd Kissinger gave a speech at the annual meeting of the editors of the Associated 
Press in the Waldorf-Astoria hotel. This speech was the first official mention of the Year of Europe, 
and can basically be seen as the start of its failure as well. The speech was patronising, and was not 
well received in Europe. It is telling that in his own autobiography Kissinger starts his description of 
the speech with excusing himself. “In four years in the Administration as national security adviser, I 
had never given a formal speech on a substantive topic. The address on the “Year of Europe” was my 
first.”101 So he was not used to giving speeches, and as Alistair Horne puts it “indeed, under another 
administration it was the kind of speech that might have been expected from a secretary of state.”102 
But one might expect that his staff would vet a speech of this calibre before it would be given, and it 
was the language, not the deliverance of the speech that irked most of the Europeans.  
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 Indeed, the language could be seen as controversial at points and just outright strange at 
others. For example, in a speech concerning an initiative named the “Year of Europe,” one would not 
expect Japan to be included. Yet the speech calls “for comprehensive trade negotiations with Europe 
as well as with Japan.”103Kissinger himself seems to have realised the irony of this ten years later as 
well: “It is a tribute to the bureaucratic momentum that the joke of naming an initiative including 
Japan the “Year of Europe” apparently struck no one.” Only because of the fact the Japanese had no 
intention of joining the initiative it “did not enter the catalogue of “Nixon shocks”.”104 
But the worst part, according to the Europeans, was a small sentence, which set the tone of 
the entire speech. It talked about diplomatic relations and basically made the Europeans out for a 
minor power, at a point in time where European confidence was at a high. “Diplomacy is the subject 
of frequent consultations but is essentially being conducted by traditional nation-states. The United 
States has global interests and responsibilities. Our European partners have regional interests.”105 
And this was for most Europeans, as Alistair Horne calls it: “this was the voice of nanny speaking”106. 
And the Europeans found this to be “preposterous.”107 This shows from their reactions: George 
Pompidou, the French President, remarked that in France, “every year was the year of Europe.” 
German Chancellor Willy Brandt saw the emergence of a pattern; he thought Kissinger “wanted to 
ensure that there was a distinction between Europe’s independent regional responsibility and its 
international co-responsibility.” And lastly Heath wrote, years later, in his memoirs: “for Kissinger to 
announce a Year of Europe was like for me to stand on Trafalgar Square and announce that we were 
embarking on a year to save America!”108 
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A rocky start? 
Concluding this chapter we can say that not only did the initiative have so much different reasoning 
behind it, that it is hard to understand how Kissinger anticipated all of this to be incorporated into 
one final document at the end of the year. The way he started it was also not well thought out. His 
speech was, after all, not only badly written and somewhat insulting towards the Europeans; it was 
also Kissinger himself who thought of this speech too lightly. As the next chapter will show, the 
Europeans were angry with Kissinger for not consulting them enough on a subject that apparently 
was so important to the entire Atlantic world. He himself has claimed that he did consult them and 
had send them drafts, but the main European criticism boiled down to the fact that these drafts were 
too little too late. He seemed to have missed the importance of European integration for the 
Europeans, and apparently had too little insight in European mind-set to understand why they felt 
insulted. How this played out for the rest of the initiative and the way Heath and the British handled 
such an initiative, which, for them, seemed to come out of nowhere will be shown in the next 
chapters. 
  
37 
 
Chapter 3: The Start of the Year of Europe, from a British perspective.  
This chapter will take a look at the way the British reacted to the American initiative, and how they 
responded. There will be a close focus on both Heath’s and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s 
way of handling this ‘sudden’ American initiative, and why it proved to be so problematic to 
formulate a response to the American plan. Lots of the difficulties were caused by the French, and 
therefore some attention will have to be devoted to them aswell, to provide for a complete picture. 
This chapter will focus on the first few months of the initiative, the period leading to a time that 
could be seen as an all-time low in the trans-Atlantic relationships in this period, the next one will 
start at that point in time, and see how attempts were made to restore the relations.  
Before April 23 
The Americans, wanting to use the – in their eyes still – special relationship, had offered to work 
together with the British on the Year of Europe initiative even before the initiative had been 
launched by Kissinger’s speech. At a meeting at Camp David, President Nixon told Prime Minister 
Heath: “We must try to recreate the wartime habit of getting together for really intimate and deep 
discussions in a relaxed atmosphere-discussions which range over the whole ﬁeld of the problems, 
political, military and economic, which we faced together.”109 But even though Heath agreed that a 
new impulse was needed in the Atlantic relations, he did not want to start a new initiative unless it 
could be discussed and handled by European institutions, and not by bilateral discussions between 
America and separate European nations. Henry Kissinger would later write: “He wanted Europe as a 
unit [emphasis in original] to formulate answers to our queries; he was determined to avoid any 
whiff of Anglo-American collusion.” Kissinger even went as far as to state: “Heath’s attitude was 
partly obscured because his Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, and his colleagues … did their 
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efficient best to hide their Prime-Minister’s foot-dragging.”110 Apparently the staff of the FCO and 
Secretary Douglas-Home himself had given the Americans the impression that the British would be 
willing to cooperate on a bilateral level. Whether this had been a misunderstanding or if the FCO had 
been less loyal towards Heath than generally thought, “British policy, as articulated to the United 
States, ran contrary to the Prime Minister’s wishes.”111 Officially, however, the FCO complimented 
the Prime Minister of his handling of the question: “If I may say so, with all respect, I thought that the 
Prime Minister was wise to handle this aspect of our relationship in the way that he did. He made it 
clear that, whilst we would continue in the future as in the past to take account of American views in 
deciding our own contribution to the foreign relations of the Community, we would, none the less, 
be bound by such policies as the Community decided upon.”112 Heath in his memoirs does not 
mention the substance of the meetings themselves at all; his recollection of this meeting seems to 
contain more memories of the surroundings of Camp David than the meetings themselves. 
Apparently he considers –and probably considered - these meetings of less importance than the 
Americans do.113 It might be noted that even though some historians claim that for the Americans 
the Year of Europe at this stage was nothing more than a “cynical public relations ploy”114, that this 
quickly changed, and that Europe became an explicit priority within weeks. 
 Heath also writes in his memoirs that it was an affront by Kissinger to start of the Year of 
Europe, without even notifying the British. He seems to have forgotten that the British had been 
notified, by Kissinger himself, in a meeting with the British Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend.115 Not only 
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had the British been notified, the French, Italians and Western Germans were all supposedly 
informed about the language of the speech as well.116  
British reactions to the speech. 
Usually, the one quote that is used to illustrate Heath’s reaction to the Year of Europe initiative is the 
previously quoted remark about standing amongst the lions at Trafalgar square and announcing a 
year to save America. Even though this is from his memoirs and was thus written years later, it is still 
seen by many as the one quote that exemplifies Heath’s – and in some way, Europe’s- response to 
Kissinger’s year of Europe.  In the same passage Heath mentions his enquiring of Kissinger on their 
next meeting “whether he really thought it was the responsibility of the Americans to organise a Year 
of Europe.” 117 But there had to be an official reply. The first official response by the British 
government came from Douglas-Home, in a speech given on April 27th, in which he responded to 
Kissinger’s initiative in very general and broad terms “welcoming the confirmation that the United 
States Government would keep its security commitments to the allies.” But he also lessened 
American expectations by saying that “it is a mistake to ascribe too much uniformity to these 
problems or to hope to solve them in a single negotiation.”118 Here one of the crucial differences 
between American expectations and European wishes for the Year of Europe already shows: the 
Europeans saw the Atlantic Alliance first and foremost as one of security, while the Americans now 
tried linking it to other issues as well. In a minute by Secretary Trend to Heath written days after that, 
he reinforced the “dangers of making explicit responses,” while they had to “respond… in as positive 
and constructive a manner as possible while safeguarding [their] own interests to the maximum 
extent.” He foresaw problems between Kissinger’s plan – which called for “some kind of high-level 
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steering committee - and already existing institutions, not only the EC, but also NATO, GATT etc.”119 
Prime Minister Heath would later respond to this, agreeing with this notion of a response that would 
not pass beyond generalities, and wanted the briefs for Kissinger’s visit early in May to be drawn “on 
the basis of this approach.”120  
 This seemed to be against Kissinger’s wishes, who apparently wanted to ‘fix’ the Atlantic 
Relationship himself, and therefore wanted it done in a very quick manner. The cause of this rush, 
even if Watergate hadn’t forced Nixon to resign, was that at this point there was only 3 years left of 
his second term in office. Kissinger had a kind of urgency to start the plans, an urgency which the 
Europeans, trying to fix their own institutions before even attempting to realise new ones, lacked.  
 And due to the vague wording in Kissinger’s speech, the British weren’t that sure what 
Kissinger actually intended for the initiative. Because his speech referenced a new ‘Atlantic Charter’ 
the British did research into the old one, and realised that the previous charter was so vaguely 
worded, that for a new Atlantic Charter it “should not be too difficult to produce a new form of 
words.” In a memo from a member of the Western Organisations Department, Crispin Tickell, they 
even went as far as to wonder if Kissinger himself actually knew what the Atlantic Charter originally 
entailed, and if he was aware that the Soviet Union was a signatory of this Charter. This memo might 
have crossed the Prime Ministers eyes - it was copied to his private secretary - but no matter what, 
it’s an interesting insight in the early responses within the British government to Kissinger’s 
initiative.121 The question of the reply remained tricky, since Heath felt that the response should 
come from the EC, but even then the question remained: which part of the EC? The Commission 
didn’t seem to have the political weight to deal with a question of this importance, but probably 
should be included in the process, and then would have to cooperate with the Council of Ministers. 
There was little precedent for this; normally both the Council and the Commission had their own 
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capacities. And here the French were dragging their heels: even though the Council of Ministers 
would meet on the 14th and 15th of May, they refused to form a common position amongst the Nine, 
before President Pompidou had met with Prime Minister Heath a week later and with President 
Nixon at the end of the month. In a memo written early in May, the British even wondered whether 
the French would be willing to discuss EC/United States negotiations or even have talks at the 
Council of Ministers meeting after that, on June 5th. And this was upsetting the British, who found 
that “to fail to produce a collective and constructive response after six weeks would surely have a 
bad effect in the United States.”122 This same memo also includes certain procedural ‘tricks’ the 
British might have to employ to get past French objections against the inclusion of the Commission in 
the process. This does show the stance the British had on these negotiations; they wanted the EC to 
be included on every level, and make sure there was no chance of anyone suspecting closer relations 
between America and Great Britain than that there were between Britain and the continent. 
Trying to create a common response 
Before Heath met with Pompidou, Kissinger had met Jobert in Paris, where Kissinger proposed a 
four-power steering group, which “would keep things on the rails until President Nixon’s visit to 
Europe.”123  This was included in the preparation papers Heath got for his meeting with President 
Pompidou, in which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office tried to convince Heath that getting the 
French on board for a reinvigorated Atlantic Alliance would be the right thing to do. But Heath’s 
opinion differed from the one that his Foreign and Commonwealth Office held and he mentioned to 
Pompidou what unfortunate timing Kissinger’s speech had, and also how he felt that the Americans 
attempts to discuss policies in new ‘steering-groups’, even though there were appropriate forums for 
these topics – defence in NATO, trade in GATT etc. -, was at times “a dangerous approach.”124 So the 
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French were not cooperating or in any way forthcoming on creating a common response, and 
Kissinger was growing “increasingly perplexed” by the lack of response. 125 
 But there were of course other powers in Europe. The fourth of the four powers in the high-
level meetings proposed by Kissinger were the Western Germans led by Chancellor Willy Brandt. In a 
meeting with Brandt Heath again followed the same line he had taken with the French, he 
emphasised the need for a strong relationship between the United States and Europe, but also didn’t 
consider Kissinger’s approach to politics, where everything needed to be considered together, the 
right path to go on. His behaviour and speech is described by Catherine Hynes as “such as calculated 
mix of praise and criticism seemed guaranteed to provoke maximum confusion and 
misunderstanding.” Apparently Heath considered a slow, well thought out response to be better 
than a fast one, even if this could offend the Americans. It’s also plausible that the way he refuses to 
play a leading role in the creation of a common European response was yet another way of him 
trying to ensure that they were ‘good’ Europeans and were not just pawns of the Americans. But 
later it would show that the British would have to play this role in the process, since the French were 
not cooperative in the least, and the Germans seemed to be fine with a position on the side-line, 
while focussing on other issues such as Brandt’s Ostpolitik. The other powers were of such minor 
importance in these discussions that they were just expected to go along with whatever the big four 
came up with.  
Meetings in Reykjavik 
At the end of May, the long waited talks between Pompidou and Nixon would take place, at a 
summit in Reykjavik. Neither of these men was really in the right mind set at that time. Nixon was 
obviously preoccupied by the Watergate affair, and Pompidou was fighting a losing battle against 
cancer, his leukaemia had just entered the final stages. Before these meetings, no one really knew 
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what the French position on the negotiations would be. Just a week before the summit on a political 
directors meeting in the EEC, the United States/EEC relations were discussed. After this dinner, the 
British delegate reported back that the dinner was “unsatisfactory,” since the French delegate Puaux 
had the “most restrictive brief imaginable,” his instructions were “the purest Gaullism” and even 
Puaux himself was surprised by them. This obviously did not bode well for the things the French 
would say during the Reykjavik summit.126 Heath had informed the Americans about the French 
perspective and their earlier meeting, and as before, Heath’s stance was vague and did not commit 
to anything, the closest he got to forming a view on the French position was “you will find him 
[Pompidou] genuinely anxious for a constructive outcome but reluctant to be pinned down just yet 
on any precise forum.”127 This was angering the Americans since Heath apparently refused to give 
them a more comprehensive account of what had been discussed. This vagueness makes clear that 
Heath planned on taking the back seat on these meetings, and let the French make up their minds 
about the initiative first, if not outright run the entire meetings. And this was exactly how it appeared 
to the Americans as well, Kissinger describes Heath’s stance as “the pose of a painted bystander at an 
incipient family quarrel.”128 
 At first, the meetings seemed to be making progress and were to the liking of the Americans. 
On June 4th Douglas-Home summarised the American feelings on the initiative as follows: “the 
meetings between Presidents Nixon and Pompidou were successful and marked throughout by a 
spirit of cooperation and friendship.”129 And indeed, after some minor hiccups, the French, or at least 
President Pompidou, and the Americans seemed to agree on the way in which the Year of Europe 
initiative should be carried out: through a working group which contained representatives of the big 
four, Germany, Britain, France and the United States. This was the same plan that Kissinger had 
proposed to Jobert earlier that month. But it now also included multi-lateral discussion in NATO and 
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in other already established forums, even when it was seen as a part of the Year of Europe. However, 
after the meetings concluded the French were adamant they never agreed to such plans. Kissinger in 
his biography suggests that it is Jobert who talked Pompidou out of the plan after the meeting, and 
the French now suggested they would only agree to bi-lateral talks between the United States and 
each of the three European powers separately, and that no high level group would or could be 
established. These bi-lateral discussions, according to the French, would only discuss the possibility 
of a joint “Declaration of principles” – which was the new name of the Atlantic Declaration, because 
the old name had stirred up some problems in Germany since that was of course the one country the 
original Atlantic Charter was aimed at - and actual discussion on the economy, trade and military 
issues would have to be discussed within their appropriate already existing forums. Both parties tried 
their best to convince the British that their account of the meetings was the right one, both in quite 
blunt terms. The Americans called remarks made by the French in their press briefings “nonsense”130, 
the French made it clear there had been no “meeting of the minds”131. The Americans did ask the 
British to take the lead on drafting a declaration, an issue that the British then skilfully avoided by 
asking the Americans how they thought the French would respond to such action. They still stood by 
their position that it should be organised by Europe, not a single country.132 
From quasi blackmail… 
It was getting clearer and clearer that the one threat Kissinger kept repeating in these negotiations, 
the threat that Congress would call back troops from Europe unless negotiations for a new Atlantic 
Charter got underway and the interest for Europe was renewed in the United States, was getting 
emptier and emptier. Kissinger himself warned the British for this “quasi blackmail” that would spell 
“the beginning of the end of the Alliance,” but the British got their own analysis of internal United 
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States politics that said there had been “little visible activity.”133 Congress, however, did get annoyed 
by the Administration’s lack of progress, which is why the Americans seemed to schedule so many 
“meetings, visits, charters…” to keep congressional encroachment at bay.134 
 During this period, Heath got increasingly annoyed with the lack of progress as well, and was 
wondering whether or not to let the initiative be, since most issues were already being discussed in 
other forums. The plan he came up with was that there would have to be multiple declarations, all of 
them covering one of the areas that together would offer ‘insuperable problems’.135 The French had 
apparently agreed to produce a draft declaration136, and the Americans were preparing a draft 
version as well. Later on, the French would deny that they had agreed to the drafting of any text.137 
The Americans did get to work with the draft though, and on the 14th of June, the British ambassador 
in Washington received – in secret- the list of proposed headings for the declaration draft. “It would 
be prudent,” he would write, “not to volunteer to Secretary Rodgers or to the United States Embassy 
in London that we have received this text. Nor of course should we discuss it with our European 
partners.”138However, Kissinger himself subsequently sent a message saying that he would have no 
problems with the British discussing these headings with the French.139 This American draft still 
contained headings for both “Security and defense” and for “economic relationships.”140 
 Nevertheless, Heath still had misgivings about the entire initiative. The way Kissinger had 
handled the announcement was rude, and based on a world vision that no longer existed. For 
monetary, economic and trade matters, Europe was now united in the EC, which meant that the 
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Kennedy concept of the “twin pillars”141 was a reality. The only thing the old Atlantic Alliance still 
consisted of was for security matters, the one thing that had not been integrated into the EC. And 
this was where Heath’s plan of two declarations came in. One had to be formed in the EC and would 
cover areas the EC also incorporated; the other would come from NATO. This would prevent the 
problems that would arise from negotiating say economic and security interests in the same forum, 
where EC countries might have to “put their interests at the disposition of non-Community 
Europeans such as Iceland and Greece.”142 This attitude was also the stance Heath took during a 
Cabinet meeting he chaired on the 20th of June, a meeting that mainly revolved around the Year of 
Europe initiative and how to handle it. In this meeting Heath suggested that the main difficulties in 
the initiative lied with the Americans, who “were finding it difficult to adjust themselves to their loss 
of pre-eminence in military, economic and monetary affairs.” The Europeans, on their part, had 
found the timing of and the way the announcement of the initiative was made unacceptable, 
especially the lack of consultation from the Americans. The fact that it was started just a few months 
after the EC enlargement did not make the possibility of a unified response or approach any easier. 
The meeting ended with a conclusion by the Prime Minister, in which he reaffirmed his belief that a 
single declaration would turn out to be impossible, and that one draft would have to come from 
NATO, and the other should come from the Nine. This latter declaration might proof to be difficult to 
outline due to the French continually dragging their heels, but in discussion during the meeting it was 
suggested that a tougher line with the French might prove in the British interest, and might be 
welcomed by the rest of the nine.143  
 However, in a meeting with Jobert early in July, the Frenchman remarked that he was not 
sure whether the French “wanted a document or documents.” He observed that there might not be a 
need for a European paper to be drafted; Europe just had to answer to the American paper. The 
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discussion seemed to be undertaken in a friendly matter, there was just a massive gap between the 
way the French and the British approached the principle of a declaration. The French wanted to keep 
the powers of the EC in very distinct separate spheres, where the Commission should not be included 
in discussions undertaken by the Council of Ministers. Jobert was ready to meet with the Council of 
Ministers as much as they needed during the summer, but he was not ready to discuss them with the 
Commission. Even though meeting in Brussels would be much more convenient, Jobert’s instructions 
were “only to attend such a meeting if it was held in the capital of the Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers.”144 The proposed hard-line with the French was not taken in this meeting, and neither 
Heath nor Douglas-Home managed to get Jobert to concede anything. However, the French 
government themselves had reached the conclusion that the European Institutions should be 
involved as well, if only as a test. In a memo quoted by Marloes C. Beers they agree to let the political 
institutions of the EC take part in the negotiations to “test the intention of our partners to take 
common positions that are truly European.” This illustrates the French position well: they did not 
mind the American efforts for a renewed Atlantic Alliance, but their first and foremost objective was 
that the response from the European side would be united, especially on Community matters. This 
was also why they were so adamant that the declaration would be split into two or more 
declarations, so that there would be a declaration that could come directly from the Community, 
without having to deal with, for example, security issues, which was not a Community matter.145 
 Negotiations seemed to have reached a halt, little to no real progress was achieved, and the 
parties could barely figure out what format the response would be in. As Kissinger would later 
describe it, the Year of Europe was turning into a “wrestling match.”146 But there was no way the 
Europeans would be able to just ignore the initiative, without deeply offending the Americans. 
                                                             
144 MWE 3/304/1, ‘Record of conversation: Jobert, Heath and Douglas-Home at 10 Downing Street’, 2 July 
1973, DBFPO:III:IV.  
145 Marloes C. Beers, ‘European Unity and the Transatlantic Gulf in 1973’, in: Giles Scott-Smith and Valerie 
Aubourg (eds.), Atlantic, Euratlantic, or Europe-America: The Atlantic Community and the European Idea from 
Kennedy to Nixon (Paris 2011), pp. 486-505, there pp. 492-493. 
146 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 174. 
48 
 
Therefore when Heath messaged Nixon early in July, he tried to strike a positive tone: the initiative, 
according to Heath, would “reinforce *their+ cohesion and common strength.”147 This was an obvious 
echoing of Nixon’s own words when he informed Heath on the results of his (Nixon’s) talks with 
Brezhnev, where he asserted that the handling of the East-West issue should be mostly undertaken 
from a common position amongst the Western allies. There “should be no illusion in Moscow that a 
competition for Soviet favours is developing amongst Western countries.”148 
 Around that same date149, Kissinger, anxious to move things along, mailed copies of the two 
American draft declarations to both the Germans and the British. The French had already received 
theirs a few days before that, which in turn piqued the British, who felt “discriminated against.”150 
And besides this, the British were not impressed by the language of the drafts in any way. The 
wording in both drafts – one written by the American State department, one written by Kissinger’s 
own NSC – was seen as “clumsy and inelegant”; the NSC draft was also regarded as just outright 
“bad.” Neither one offered any advantage for the British, but the NSC one in particular was seen as 
hurtful for the British interests. Both still tried to contain the entire declaration in one draft and not 
in two, as Heath had intended.151 
…. to an all-time low. 
Both Kissinger and the British hoped that the next meeting of the nine Foreign Ministers, on July 23rd, 
would end this impasse. The British had continued writing their draft in the meanwhile, and hoped to 
put it forward during this meeting. But progress was still slow and very little, if anything was 
achieved. Heath later tried to give a positive spin to the whole ordeal in a message to Nixon by 
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blaming the lack of progress on the briefness of the meeting, “but some progress was made and I 
think you can be reasonably confident that we shall be able to give you further good news after the 
next ministerial meeting on 10/11 September.” This would, of course, be nearly half a year after the 
original announcement by Kissinger. The only thing the Nine managed to agree on was that they 
would be ready to receive Nixon if he would come to Europe in the autumn. Heath in this message 
again emphasises the need for more than one declaration, but also stresses that the French have 
been playing out the smaller countries against the British, who had not kept their allies up to date on 
their bi-lateral talks with the Americans. He seemed to be referencing to the two draft declarations 
the British had received from the Americans, two draft declarations which he himself had received as 
well, even before the British had. The nine ministers now had decided that all information obtained 
bi-laterally with the United States would be shared amongst all of them, to “harmonise their 
reactions.”152 
 The tone in which this was written, and the obvious lack of progress which Heath seemed to 
try and sugar-coat, elicited an “unusually cool”153 response from Nixon. Nixon found the debates 
“disturbing,” the way the French exploited the bi-lateral meetings “puzzling,” especially since they 
were the first ones to suggest bi-lateral talks and he was now openly wondering if his planned visit to 
Europe would not have a “highly negative effect.” Also “it *was+ hard to understand the refusal of our 
allies to discuss the substance of our mutual relationships after three months of strenuous efforts on 
our part to elicit their views,” which referenced the new British policy of trying to form a response 
amongst the Nine without keeping the Americans informed.154 Kissinger was angry about this as well, 
which he expressed in a meeting a week later: “It was a new development in United States relations 
with Britain. Never before had there been a failure at the beginning of a major negotiation to keep 
each other informed of their thinking.” He even went as far as to declare the “Year of Europe over,” 
because he doubted a group “which could not agree on procedure, could possibly agree on a 
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declaration which would have to be co-ordinated with NATO and fully worked out before 15 
November.” Later on in the discussions, Kissinger summed up the big differences between the 
European point of view and the American: for Kissinger, the Atlantic Alliance and its place in the 
world took precedence over everything: “A declaration of Atlantic Unity should have preceded work 
on the political unity of the Nine. The Nine have reversed the order.”155  
 For Heath this all-time low came at the worst possible moment. Early in August, he was in a 
conference with the heads of the Commonwealth nations, which diverted his attention away from 
the troubles in the Atlantic relationship. He still found time to message Nixon voicing his concerns 
that “we may allow misunderstandings to grow to a point where we lose sight of what is I believe our 
common objective: that of reaffirming the purposes and vitality of the Atlantic relationship.”156 On 
the same day Heath also messaged Chancellor Brandt and President Pompidou, in which he stated 
that even though Kissinger’s plan had started off with an uninformed approach and inadequate 
preparation, he (Kissinger) would still blame the Europeans if the visit of President Nixon got 
cancelled because of a lack of European response to the Year of Europe. Therefore Heath suggested 
that the three of them would meet informally, to “examine what action Europe should now take.” 
This might lead to dissatisfaction amongst the other six members of the Nine, but to them it should 
be made clear that “such a meeting was not to take final decisions but to exchange views prior to the 
meeting of the Nine.”157 Brandt agreed with this position, but only if the French would as well.158 
Pompidou replied evasively, claiming he was not sure that a meeting of the three principal European 
powers would be interpreted well.159  
Conclusion 
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At this point in time, it seems that the Year of Europe had reached an all-time low. Spirits on both 
sides of the Atlantic were glum, and there were very few people who believed that the initiative 
could still achieve the things Henry Kissinger had set out to do from the beginning. There were many 
misgivings about the entire ordeal on both sides; the Europeans feeling offended by the Americans 
because to them Kissinger seems to have surprised them with his plans. Most of all they were 
offended by his lack of consultations, which led to a uniformed and a not very thoroughly prepared 
initiative. Here there is a little difference of opinion between both parties as well. The Americans felt 
they had done enough to prepare the Europeans for the initiative, giving them draft versions of the 
speech before it was given. But the Europeans felt that for such a big initiative more should have 
been done. They should’ve been consulted before the speech was given, they should’ve been asked 
for their opinion. The Americans, on the other hand, were getting angrier by the day with the lack of 
progress the Europeans were making in the drafting of a response, and by now they were openly 
wondering if the Europeans were not doing it on purpose and if the Europeans actually even wanted 
a renewed and reinvigorated Atlantic relationship. 
 The British seemed to have been caught in the middle of all this, as they had usually been 
closer to the Americans than to the continent, but by now were redefining these relationships. 
Within the British government, there were different views as well. Heath was terrified of appearing 
too close to the Americans, which is why he did barely anything without consulting the French at 
first. Later on, when he started to realise that the French would continue their reluctance to 
participate unless everyone gave in to their semi-Gaullist demands, he became more pro-active and 
tried to salvage the initiative. Even though the French were at times outright hostile towards the 
initiative and seemed to lack any aspirations to work with the Americans on it, Heath did try and 
make the most of the initiative. Although he did not agree with Kissinger’s world vision, he did seem 
to concur with the idea that Europe was still dependent on America for its defence and he therefore 
did not want to lose their support. He tried to steer the initiative away from Community matters, or 
at least wanted that separate from the defence part, especially since the countries of NATO - , in 
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which France had a much smaller role - could handle that. His own Foreign and Commonwealth 
office had been trying to work with the Americans since the beginning, since Alec Douglas-Home was 
much more eager to join them and that shows in the difference in tone with which both men talked 
to the Americans. Heath was much more standoffish and tried to demonstrate to the outside world 
that the British were good Europeans, while the language of Douglas-Home fits in with the old 
tradition of the “special relationship.” The next chapter will show what happened with the initiative 
from this low point in trans-Atlantic relationships, and how Heath managed to please both the 
Europeans and the Americans, if he actually managed that. 
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Chapter 4: Did the year of Europe recover from its lowpoint?  
Kissinger becomes Secretary of State 
The later it was during the year, the more trouble the developments in the Watergate scandal got 
Nixon into. The only person in his administration that seemed relatively unscathed by the entire 
ordeal was Henry Kissinger. Kissinger’s support for the President became of growing importance, 
which eventually would lead to him getting a more public and prestigious function, that of Secretary 
of State. Nixon did not want to give this function to Kissinger, but as Nixon would later recall: “Henry 
wanted State, felt he deserved it, and let me know that he would resign if he didn’t get it.”160 
Starting in August 
While Heath was away in Ottawa, Douglas-Home ordered the FCO to draft a document which related 
“the identity of the Nine vís a vís the United States.” This document shows the fundamental 
differences in the ideas the Nine and the Americans had for the declarations. The Americans looked 
for concrete plans in the widest possible scope; they wanted the Year of Europe to bring forth a big 
Agreement, of the grand scale and importance of the old Atlantic Charter. “The Americans regard the 
Year of Europe as a year which should not end without a transatlantic agreement at least as dramatic 
and substantial as those the Americans have already secured with China and the Soviet Union.” The 
Nine, on the other hand, envisioned the Year to be the start of “a long process” in trans-Atlantic 
negotiations.161 
 After returning to London, Heath tried to convince Nixon that the next meeting of the 
Foreign Ministers of the Nine would provide ample progress towards an actual declaration, so that 
Nixon would be able to come to Europe, without it looking like he was going to a hostile 
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environment, as Nixon now feared. Instead it would look like a tour of his greatest allies. But Nixon’s 
latest message had disturbed Heath, and he had grown uneasy by the American position which 
seemed to be outright antagonistic by now. There was no question of the two countries becoming 
“adversaries” but Nixon needed to understand that “Europe was struggling to achieve a new 
identity” and that this was a “slow business.” The second Copenhagen meeting on 10-11 September, 
however, “may prove to be a new point of departure from which discussions on the relations 
between the United States and Europe will be given fresh impetus and carried forward with greater 
purpose and conviction.”162 Nixon replied very briefly and also very distant, it looked like he didn’t 
fully believe anything would happen, so it looked like he would wait until he could review the 
outcome of the meeting in Copenhagen before committing to anything.163 
 Heath had good reason to believe that the Copenhagen meeting would deliver on its 
promises though. Late in August he had had a meeting with Jobert, during which the Frenchman gave 
his support for the British draft declaration. There had been Italian remarks that the draft should’ve 
gone further to meet the American wishes, but the French felt it went far enough. There were some 
doubts about the German position though, and both Jobert and Heath agreed that it was of vital 
importance that the Germans were locked “into the European Community and the developing 
European entity.” Also because of some worries by other governments, such as the previously 
mentioned Italian comments, as well as apprehension by the Dutch, the draft would be presented as 
a British draft instead of a European one.164 But to Heath it seemed they were moving in the right 
direction and this meeting seemed to confirm his ideas. A sceptic might think that the way the 
French did not want to put their own name under the draft was a way in which they could later 
publicly deny knowledge of it, attack the draft and so win even more time, but Heath did not seem to 
think this was the case. Heath’s position was later reinforced by comments from Jobert in which he 
claimed there would be an eighty per cent chance that the next Copenhagen meeting would deliver a 
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common Community position.165 The doubts about the German position were quickly dissolved as 
well, since after French pressure on the German Secretary of State he suggested to his government 
“that West Germany no longer expose itself to the controversies over European-United States 
relations, but let the French and British have their way.” This made way for smoother internal 
negotiations, with the one big power in Europe that was the most supportive of the close link 
between Europe and the United States having taken itself out of the equation.166  
 And indeed, the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in September did prove to be fruitful and 
constructive. Douglas-Home messaged Heath immediately after, saying that the meeting had been 
“very satisfactory,” and that even the Commission President, François-Xavier Ortoli, had been 
included in the meeting, with French consent. Ortoli had understandably been a bit sore about the 
short notice and previous exclusions, but Douglas-Home thought that there was ground for future 
community participation in the negotiations.167 The meeting decided that a draft would have to be 
completed next week, on the 17th of September. This draft would include paragraphs on community 
matters written by the permanent representatives in Brussels, which seems to be a step forward in 
community participation as well. Of course the permanent representatives are in Brussels to defend 
their respective national interests, but they were full-time European officials, which seemed to be a 
step towards a more European draft, compared to the purely national-interest based negotiations in 
the Council of Ministers. This meeting also decided that a paper dealing with the European identity 
would have to be written before Nixon’s visit. All in all it seems that this was the first actually 
constructive meeting the Europeans had had on the topic, even though the Danish chair Andersen 
was “his usual inept, if genial, self.”168 
 The Americans on the other hand, were still much upset at the way these negotiations were 
being dealt with. When asked their reaction to the Copenhagen meetings, Kenneth Rush, the acting 
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secretary of state – this was days before Kissinger’s official initiation -, responded quite harshly. He 
resented the way the Europeans now acted as a bloc, Nixon had intended for the meetings to be “a 
series of bilateral discussions with old friends,” but the Europeans were now ganging up on them and 
putting forward a paper without consultations with the Americans. The British retorted that it would 
“be wholly unreasonable on the part of the Americans to expect to be in on the deliberations of a 
club of which they were not members.” But this meeting did make the British realise they were not 
just “dealing with Kissinger tantrums” but that there was a bigger misunderstanding in American 
politics of European plans and aims.169 And days later Kissinger himself restated the American 
misapprehensions with the European reaction: they had troubles understanding what the common 
position would be about, what actual power the President of the Commission for example had, and 
why they could no longer hold discussions with their closest allies. Discussions through NATO had 
been fruitful but the Americans said the wire with the Community “just went dead.”170 
 The next day, Andersen presented Kissinger with the European draft declaration. The 
meeting only contributed to American pains about the entire process, since Andersen was in no way 
authorized to conduct negotiations on his own; he was only allowed to take note of American 
comments and then take them back to the Nine.171 In their amended version of the draft, which was 
submitted to the Europeans only a couple of days later, the Americans emphasised the “mutually 
interdependent relations” in all key areas with which the Declaration would be concerned, such as 
economy but most importantly security and the relation to the USSR. All in all the American 
amended declaration was of a much wider scope than the European version. To illustrate the 
differences, the American version was over 30% longer than the European draft and seemed to 
change much European language that could be seen as vague (things as “they attach importance”) to 
much  stronger and clearer language (“they agree to”). Overall the American language seemed to be 
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much more binding, with clear agreements on key areas, instead of the European draft which was 
much more theoretical.172 In their own notes on the amendments, the Americans recorded that they 
want to make the partnership between the Nine and the United States explicit, instead of the 
European idea of “equilibrium.” They really wanted to drive home their idea of a mutually 
interdependent relationship between the United States and Europe, in “all spheres.”173 This last point 
especially would be hard to get into the final text: it was not thought the French would ever agree to 
such wording. Formal partnership with the Americans would, according to them, detract from 
European independence. Much discussion would have to go into the text before a final version could 
be agreed on.174 This discussion was planned to take place in New York in a meeting of 
representatives of the Nine with the United States, on October 18th and 19th.  
However, by now the question was already arising of when the declaration could be signed 
and by whom. The Americans wanted a NATO summit, but the French did not agree on a meeting of 
heads of government. Kissinger responded that it would be an affront for Nixon to meet with foreign 
ministers, who were below his level. A solution was found by the British government: what if they 
delayed the Nixon visit to April, when the 25th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty 
would be celebrated. This also fell neatly in the Year of Europe, if they took the April 23rd speech as a 
starting point. This was also suggested by Heath to Brandt in a meeting early in October. But just 
days later, things changed. All preparation would be negated by events in the Middle-East, which 
completely altered Kissinger’s schedule and therefore the negotiations on the declarations. 
The Yom-Kippur War 
The Middle-East had long before the Year of Europe been an area on which the Americans and 
Europeans disagreed, and it was this area “which provoked the most serious falling out between the 
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United States and Europe.”175 The Americans had already been on the Israeli side, while the 
Europeans, including Heath, took a more balanced approach and saw that both parties were in the 
wrong. Early in 1973, when tensions were on the rise in the Middle East, Heath received complaints 
from the Board of Deputies of the British Jews that he and his government were taking the Arab side. 
He would deny this but he also claimed that Israel was losing public sympathy by acting the way it 
did. 176  
When the war broke out, it came as a surprise to most of the world. Most European 
countries were, in contrast to the Americans, not directly involved. The Americans had such close 
relations with the Israelis that there was no doubt of their support, but this was dangerous terrain 
since American involvement in the conflict might get the Soviets involved as well. Therefore the 
Americans had to discuss, privately, with the Soviets what would happen. This was of course an 
affront to their NATO partners, further souring relations. The European partners were not helping to 
sustain the United States-European relationship either. Not only did the Heath government refuse to 
put forward a cease-fire resolution in the UN security council177, they, just as most of the other 
European NATO-members, refused the United States  the use of its air bases and airspace. These 
problems and differences in expectations led to major difficulties in the Anglo-American relationship. 
Not only did the American-Israeli relationship eclipse that of the old ‘special’-relationship, but also 
because for Kissinger – who basically ran the show on the foreign policy front by now – this entire 
period had been a question of loyalty. However, the Americans and British realised that they both 
still needed each other. The British were still the Americans’ closest ally in Europe and for the British 
the threat of the Cold War still loomed over the world too much to let the relationship degrade even 
further. The United States did consider ‘punishing’ the British for their behaviour, but they in the end 
decided that there was too big a risk for them to be seen as overreacting. This was also the analysis 
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by the British government at the end of the entire ordeal, after a cease-fire had been reached on the 
25th and the war ended on the 28th of October.178 After this, both parties seemed to realise that 
their relationship was in their national interests, and that it was vital that ties would not be severed 
any further. Therefore both took up the Year of Europe initiative again and tried salvaging what was 
left of it, and really worked hard on getting the declaration sorted. 
Picking up where they left off 
As Douglas-Home stated in a progress report on the Year of Europe written during the Yom-
Kippur war: ”Anglo-American relations remain a high priority for British diplomacy.” But while the 
relations on Community Subjects were now handled by the Community, other things such as political 
cooperation were still the subject of bi-lateral discussions, re-enforced by collective action. He did 
recognize however, that a point would come where this would be reversed, when political 
cooperation would above all be a Community matter, but “no-one can say when that time will 
come.”179 However, it was recognized that a common position on defence was starting to emerge, 
something which would put strains on the Atlantic relations from time to time. But in contrast to 
Heath’s actions before, Home wanted to keep bilateral lines open with the Americans, even though 
this might embarrass the European partners. This yet again illustrates the differences in positions 
between Heath and Home, whereas Heath tried his best to keep the relationship with the Europeans 
at its strongest, Home wanted to keep the Americans as their closest partners.180 Home also tried to 
defuse the situation of mutual distrust and growing anger between Heath and Kissinger by reminding 
Heath that Kissinger was used to conducting diplomacy with adversaries, and not with friends. That is 
why his diplomacy seemed to be so full of high-level, high profile meetings, and why he did not know 
very well how to approach his allies. Home assumed that this would change in the near future, and 
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even if not, the British should draw lessons from the past, they might just be stuck with Kissinger for 
the next three years.181 
Something else that still continued was the planned negotiations of the political directors of 
the Nine and representatives of the United States. Preparation had been disturbed by the events in 
the Middle East obviously, as Kissinger’s planned visits to Europe had not been able to take place, but 
they still decided that the meeting would take place. The location had been moved however, from 
New York to Copenhagen. During this meeting, the Americans were very forthcoming, they gave up 
their old bundling of the issues, “with regret and without recrimination,” and did not press too hard 
for words like interdependence and partnership in the declarations. Because of this the meeting 
could be considered a success, at least from the perspective of the Nine.182  
But hardly any actual progress was made. The French refused to take a stand on anything, 
including the question on the possibility of a meeting of Nixon and the other heads of state, claiming 
they were waiting for the drafts to be finished before committing to anything. The fact that this 
meeting was supposed to happen in Paris only added to problems. Relations between the Americans 
and British remained sour as well, because both Heath and Kissinger did not talk with much restraint. 
At the start of November Kissinger remarked to the Vice President of the European Commission, 
Christopher Soames that “the enlarged community was ‘less than the sum of its parts’” and that for 
the Americans it was now or never, the tendency towards isolationism in the United States was 
growing. Later one he’s been quoted as saying “I don’t care what happens to NATO, I’m so 
disgusted.” Heath, on the other hand, gave a speech in the same period in which he put forward a 
completely different world vision than Kissinger’s: “Washington and Moscow had to realise that 
Peking, Tokyo, Cairo and Tel Aviv, as well as Western Europe, were ‘vitally important’ too.” He 
naturally did not know that this would be his last major foreign policy speech as Prime Minister, but 
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it did summarise his vision for the world in a very concise and clear manner: for Heath, the world no 
longer consisted of two superpowers with two blocs formed around them, but had transformed into 
a multipolar world. This in combination with their membership of the EEC gave Britain the possibility 
to reassume a leading position in the world, one she “could no longer achieve on her own.”183 
On November 20th another Ministerial meeting was held in Copenhagen. As expected after 
such strong comments by Kissinger, there was no real drive to accomplish anything on the EEC draft, 
and no significant results were made. Douglas-Home, for example, was still infuriated with Kissinger 
about his comments on the British actions during the Yom-Kippur war, and was of opinion that things 
like the Atlantic Alliance were of less importance than say the Middle-East question. These views 
were reported to Kissinger in a meeting with the British Ambassador Cromer. Kissinger was still 
furious with the British during this meeting; he accused the British and French of trying to forge 
European Unity by distancing Europe from the United States, and reported that he was sad that “the 
special relationship was collapsing.” Entry of Britain into the EC should’ve raised the Community to 
the level of Britain; instead it lowered Britain’s level to that of the rest of the EC. He blamed the 
French for trying to build up Europe on an “anti-American basis” and the UK for allowing the French 
to do this. When Cromer suggested that they should put their differences aside and that the Year of 
Europe should reach a successful conclusion, Kissinger told him that for the Americans “the party was 
over.”184 This criticism of the Nine was not something Douglas-Home agreed with, but he did feel 
that if they would add some water to the wine, that they might be able to salvage some of the 
relationship. “A fence mending exercise on the part of the Nine collectively could be 
advantageous.”185 Later that month, in a meeting with some United States advisors, Kissinger would 
identify Heath as the main reason why the special relationship was faltering. He was “intellectually 
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committed to the United States,” but had no “emotional commitment.” “He was really more inclined 
towards the French.”186  
But while Douglas-Home still tried to save the relationship with America from cooling down 
even more, Heath was still furious with Kissinger’s remarks. He gave a speech where he restated his 
vision of two Europes, one that consisted of the NATO members and one distinctly different one 
consisting of the EC members. The United States had a role in the first one, but should stay out of the 
second one.  He once again criticised the lack of consultation before the start of the year, and he was 
proud of the way the Europeans came together working on a paper that discussed the European 
identity. This he ascribed to himself and his government as a personal success.187 This paper was the 
paper the Nine had agreed on writing during the July 23rd Ministerial meeting, which should have 
been of no concern to the Americans. But in a sensationalist piece published by the New York Times 
on November 29th the Nine were said to be “secretly drafting” a paper, which caused some concern 
for the British. If this would be the first the Americans heard of it, it would naturally be a cause for 
further displeasure. Especially since some parts of the paper could be seen as separating the 
Europeans from the rest of the alliance, referring to the common heritage of the Europeans, which 
seemed to be “exclusively European.”188 In the same period Associated Press reported on the way 
British government officials had been offended by the way Kissinger conducted business and 
responded to it with “biting attacks on his style of democracy.”189 Douglas-Home, again worried how 
this would affect Kissinger, immediately took action: he messaged Kissinger trying to convince him 
that there is no campaign against him, telling him not to make too much of the press reports.190 
But Kissinger did not find Douglas-Home or the FCO to be the source of the problems. In his 
opinion, there was one main culprit that had caused the difficulties in the relationship: Heath. This 
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was supported by the American embassy in London who reported “the Foreign Office is not the 
source of the difficulty in attitude toward the United States, but that Heath is.” When he mentioned 
this during a meeting with British officials, they did not agree with his claim that Heath was doing this 
on purpose to distance himself from the United States. Heath had only wanted to position himself 
closer to the Europeans, since he saw a leading role for himself and the UK within Europe. He was 
still “hooked” on the idea of a ‘special-relationship’, and the British wondered if Nixon could not play 
a role in warming things up.191 This might have had an effect on Kissinger, seeing as the next day he 
gave a press-conference in which he spoke of the differences in NATO. He said that the differences 
were well-known, but “NATO remained the cornerstone of United States foreign policy… The United 
States would spare no efforts to inject new vitality, creativity and hope. He would not be approaching 
his visit in a mood of confrontation and acrimony.”192 However, Heath remained defiant. In a meeting 
with the Italian Prime Minister Mariano Rumor he claimed that Kissinger was schizophrenic, that he 
did not understand Europe and that his mind was riddled with theoretical concepts which led him 
astray in the real world, as had been highlighted during the Middle East crisis.193 
All in all, it looked like the year was going to end with no accomplishments whatsoever. 
Douglas-Home and the FCO tried to salvage what they could, but the combined pride and mutual 
misunderstanding of Kissinger on the one hand, and Heath and the French on the other meant that it 
was all looking very bad for the initiative. Even though Heath still saw the relationship with America 
as a vital one for British interests, the way Kissinger acted did seem to strike the wrong way and 
make him act defiant, whether it was on purpose or not. Meanwhile, the effects of the Middle-East 
crisis were still felt in Europe, oil embargoes were causing big problems all over Western Europe.  In 
Britain, this led to a huge popularity drop for the Heath government, one that would prove to be too 
much to overcome for his government in the end. Heath’s image among the members of the Nine 
had taken a hit as well, since the discovery of North Sea oil had made his country not as dependent 
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on imported oil as the others and was therefore not as supportive of Community action on an energy 
front, one that for Heath was still a national issue.194 However, things took a turn for the worse for 
Heath when coal miners started striking in Britain, which led to Heath turning to the one last option 
he had left to decide whether he could still lead the country: asking that country for a mandate in a 
general election. These elections were scheduled for February 28th, 1974. The outcome was 
unexpected; there was a hung parliament which meant neither party had a majority. The Liberals 
would have to provide a majority for either government. Heath argued for a coalition with the 
Liberals in his own party, but could not even convince his own Cabinet of the proposed concessions. 
Therefore on the 4th of March, Heath conceded defeat and Harold Wilson would once more become 
Prime-Minister. 
Conclusion 
During this period we see Heath and the FCO coming closer together. The FCO was getting put off by 
Kissinger’s ‘hostile’ form of diplomacy, which focussed on achieving treaties, meetings and/or 
summits, while Heath saw that the French in many respects were not holding up the initiative for – in 
his eyes - valid reasons, but tried to stall progress as much as possible because they wanted the 
initiative to fail, or at least for the end result to be as weak as possible. The French opposition 
hindered the initiative greatly, because at first Heath did not want to consent to anything without 
the French agreeing with him, but later, when he realised their efforts to stall were not driven by 
practical, but by political reasons, he seemed to care less about their opinion and started to work 
with the FCO on drafts for the, by now, several declarations.  
 This was used by the French as a way of slowing down progress even more; they called out 
the British on this in a meeting of the Nine, saying that they were working bi-laterally with the 
Americans, while it should be going through the Nine, seeing as it was a Community effort. That they 
themselves were also drafting declarations on their own was handily omitted by the French. This led 
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to the British having to put their own talks with the Americans on the backburner, which slowed 
down the initiative even more and set a lot of bad blood in America, especially with Kissinger. 
Obviously did the British not close of diplomatic relations entirely with the Americans, but they could 
and would not inform the Americans on negotiations taking place among the Nine any more, 
although the FCO staff on occasion did give up some details when pressed. 
These distinctions between Heath and Douglas-Home became vaguer after the Middle-East 
crises, because now the FCO also started to wonder about Kissinger’s way of conducting business. His 
open comments on the Nine and the British in particular were often derogatory and sometimes they 
were outright attacks on their way of dealing with his initiative. For Kissinger this had the main 
priority, and the Atlantic Alliance came above all, and since Nixon was occupier more and more by 
Watergate, Kissinger was the one running the show. However, the Europeans and especially Heath 
saw that their main priority should now lie with the emerging new European Community, as all the 
discussions on the European identity would show. And Heath’s vision for Europe and the world 
meant that the Americans would just have to deal with them through the established frameworks of 
the EC, even if the chairman at that time was seen as weak and ineffective, as was the case with the 
Danish Foreign Minister chairing in this period.  
The parties that have played the biggest roles in this thesis – Heath, the FCO, and Kissinger - 
can therefore all be said to have different objectives and goals in mind for the Year of Europe 
initiative. How and what these objectives were, and how their world vision affected these will be 
discussed in the final conclusion, but first this thesis will, in order to show a complete picture of the 
Year of Europe, shortly discuss the end result of the initiative in an epilogue, even though in that 
period Heath had already left office. 
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Epilogue: The year of Europe after Heath 
After Heath had left office, the new British government immediately departed from the path he had 
chosen for Britain and returned the country back to its old partner, the United States. The Wilson 
government was outspoken Atlanticist and in favour of the special relationship that Heath had – in 
the opinion of the new Labour secretary – weakened by his deep and lasting commitment to Europe.  
 Work on the draft declarations continued, with the NATO declaration being the only one 
where actual progress was made. The Community one was still marred by controversy, with a draft 
presented by the European partners shot down by the Americans as being ‘unsatisfactory’, the 
United States calling it too much a “United States recognition of the European identity.”195 Kissinger 
himself was so angry with the draft that he blew up while giving a speech to the wives of American 
senators, apparently unaware reporters were present. “"I would say that the biggest problem 
American foreign policy confronts,” he grumbled, "is not how to regulate competition with its 
enemies—we have a generation of experience with this, and with ups and downs we are going to 
handle it—but how to bring our friends to a realization that there are greater common interests than 
simply self-assertiveness”” wrote Time magazine later that month, reporting on remarks which had 
caused shock all over Europe. “French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert, who later in the week 
accompanied President Georges Pompidou on a state visit to the Soviet Union: "Kissinger does not 
understand Europe." In Bonn, a ranking German official complained: "Now we have a cold war 
between America and Europe." A Belgian official advised Europe to "try to behave, publicly at least, 
as if we did not hear Kissinger’s remarks”” is just a small selection of the reactions from Europe that 
were reported.196 And while Kissinger and the Department of State tried their best to refute these 
comments and conciliate with their European partners, Nixon himself apparently had had enough as 
well, and during a press conference remarked that “the day of the one-way street is gone.” 
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Europeans had to be as forthcoming to the Americans, as the Americans – in his view -  had been to 
them. “Both sides of the Atlantic had to determine ‘either to go along together on all fronts or to go 
separately’.”197 These two events, in combination with the already growing distrust between both 
parties would lead to the end of the Declaration of Principles, the one that was supposed to cement 
relations between the EC and the United States for years to come. Nixon’s grand tour of Europe was 
wiped from his itinerary and consultation with the United States was decided by the Nine to be, from 
that moment on, on a case by case basis.  
 The one thing that was still left to be discussed was the NATO declaration, which both parties 
wanted to get done before the 25th anniversary of the Treaty, as to give the celebrations an extra 
impulse. And just before this anniversary on the 26th of June, on June 19th, they actually managed to 
finish the declaration. Largely based on a French draft, it also included a provision for a consultation 
mechanism between the Europeans and the Americans.  But if this was more than just a hollow shell, 
was to be seen. Although both the Americans and Europeans were satisfied with this draft, its 
wording and language is vague. The Consultation mechanism referred to earlier is nothing more than 
this sentence “The Allies are convinced that the fulfilment of their common aims requires the 
maintenance of close consultation, cooperation and mutual trust,” and does not seem to carry a 
whole lot of weight. The French influence on the draft is also very noticeable, while there are 
references to the significant and irreplaceable role the American and Canadian forces have in the 
defence of Europe, the role of the Europeans is stressed to a much larger extent, and also their own 
nuclear capabilities are presented as a major deterrent. There is even a reference to the European 
Community and its present move towards more unity, which “should in due course have a beneficial 
effect on the contribution to the common defence of the Alliance of those of them who belong to it.” 
One is only left to wonder what Kissinger and Nixon really felt about such language being included in 
the only declaration that the Year of Europe would produce. Beyond these things, the declaration 
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basically is a renewed statement of the objectives of the NATO, so many of the paragraphs are about 
“reaffirming,” “rededicating” and “recalling” the objectives in the first NATO declaration.198  
 And the celebrations that took place were not as festive as one would’ve expected. When the 
heads of government came together to sign the Treaty in Brussels, the shadow of Watergate was 
looming over Nixon so much that “the European statesmen behaved as though the ‘cancer on the 
Presidency was a cancer on the person’.”199 But at least Nixon was still in office; he was the only one 
of the leaders of the ‘big Four’ who still was. Heath’s loss of the election has been covered, but also 
Brandt had to leave office suddenly. One of his aides was found to be a Soviet spy, something that 
led to such a big scandal that he had no other option than to resign. And on April 2nd, Pompidou had 
died of the disease he had been fighting all through the year. Interesting to note here is that all the 
new heads of Government were more Atlanticists than their predecessors. Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt was a “mainstay of close Atlantic ties,” who wanted to separate himself from the path 
Brandt had chosen for Germany, he moved from Brandt’s Ostpolitik to a more Atlanticist vision of the 
world. Prime Minister d’Estaing was less pro-America than Schmidt or Wilson, but he was however 
willing to take steps to improve his countries relationship with the United States. “Giscard’s 
presidency transformed [the Franco-American relationship] to a close approximation of genuine 
partnership.”200  
 So what did it the declaration in the end deliver for Kissinger and the Americans? One could 
say very little, especially not when comparing it with the pre-1973 situation. The entire thing was a 
reaffirmation of the Atlantic Relationship, and did not give the relationship the impulse that would’ve 
taken it to the next level. But it did signify to the rest of the world, that even though there had been 
a period of uncertainty – the entire year of ’73 – the allies had finally come together and the 
transatlantic relations were at least on the same level as they had been previously, if not higher. The 
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new leaders in Europe were much more pro-America, and thus much more committed to an Atlantic 
relationship instead of just a European one. And for Kissinger, this came at just the right time, since 
shortly after the signing of the new declaration the summit between Nixon and Brezhnev took place, 
in which the Americans surely felt stronger being backed by the new declaration.201 
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Conclusion 
 
At the start of this thesis, the question was posed as to what Heaths role in the Year of Europe was. 
Over the course of this thesis, I have painted a clear picture of not only his role, but also the deeper 
reasoning behind his actions. From the start of his political career at the Oxford Debating Union to 
his time as Prime Minister, the position of Britain in Europe and thus foreign policy has played a huge 
role in shaping his world views. These views were pretty rigid; he has had during his career a single 
objective that stood head and shoulders above any others he might have had. This objective, or 
dream even, was for Britain to regain the role that it once played in the world. Realising that this 
could not be done in the way Britain had previously gained its immense power - due to the loss of its 
empire – he now saw Europe and its emerging European Community as a way to make this dream a 
reality. And when Britain had entered the European Community in 1973, he tried to manoeuvre 
Britain into such a position that it would be able to play a leading role in the Community and through 
it in the world. To get Britain in this position, he first needed to gain the trust of the other 
Community members, especially France. He needed to prove to France that Britain’s allegiance now 
lay with Community, and not with the Americans, with whom Britain had endured a ‘special’ 
relationship for so long. Even his use of vocabulary, such as the emphasis on Britain’s ‘natural’ 
relationship with the Americans, points to this. Therefore, Kissinger’s initiative came at the worst 
possible time for Heath, especially since it seemed to have caught him of guard. In this conclusion, a 
quick recap will be given of the events during the year and how Heath’s handling of the events fits in 
it with this aforementioned theory of his objectives, and his ‘master plan’ for the recovery of Britain’s 
status as a world power. This is of interest in the way that it shows that one man’s ideas can have 
such a big impact on the world, especially because the world of foreign policy is a world that seems 
to consist of much more back channel politics than domestic issues. This thesis will refrain from 
taking a position in such a heated debate, but in the conclusion it will however provide ample 
information to fuel the debate. But one could argue against such an opaque way of dealing with such 
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matters, especially on such important matters. Others will state that because there is so much at 
stake and public opinion is so much influenced by domestic matters that their opinion on these kinds 
of issues would be too clouded with these domestic concerns that transparency is not always a good 
thing.  
Heath and Europe 
Heath’s interest in Europe was already established well before his political career. Some might even 
go back to his elderly home, which was located close to the British coast from where - on a clear day - 
one could see France, to see the root of this interest, but that would probably be stretching it. His 
interest in Europe most likely stems from his experiences as a student, when he travelled through 
Europe, and also experienced the rise of fascism first hand. These experiences with fascism were 
obviously strengthened by his wartime experiences, when he returned to the continent. His wish for 
a strong and closely intertwined Europe surely has some basis in these experiences. He had seen with 
his own eyes what could happen if Europeans actively opposed each other; it was something that 
had to be prevented at all costs. A strong European Community would be a way to prevent this and 
this surely has been a major influence on Heath’s thinking. But obviously, this Community would not 
necessarily have to be European. The Atlantic Community could be an excellent deterrent as well, 
probably in the same manner the European one could be. But yet Heath was a much bigger 
supporter of the European Community than the Atlantic one. This is because of the previously stated 
vision Heath had for Britain, and the way he saw the world. His desire was for Britain to play a 
leading role in the world again, something that could happen through the European Community, but 
in the Atlantic Community, which was so obviously dominated by the Americans, there was a much 
slimmer chance of this happening. 
 In Heath’s world vision the era of the bipolar world was over. The world had transformed 
into a multi-polar world, the power had been spread over much more areas of the world than just 
the western and eastern blocs. Europe, Japan, the Middle East were now starting to challenge the 
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two old superpowers, at least economically. The world of international relations, on the other hand, 
was still dominated by the old idea of the two superpowers balancing each other out, while the rest 
of the world belonged to either of their camps. This was the vision Kissinger almost manically 
subscribed to, which led to the major differences between the two of them. 
Kissinger, Douglas-Home and the Year of Europe 
In this we see that even on a fundamental level, Heath and Kissinger had different visions for the 
world. For Kissinger’s two-power ideology it was of vital importance that the Western, or Atlantic, 
Alliance would remain firmly together, to keep the balance of power intact. Heath, on the other 
hand, thought that the time of the superpowers was over when he came to office, and therefore 
concentrated on Europe, which would be one of the new ‘poles’ in his multi-polar world. The effect 
was that while Heath still saw America as a valuable ally, especially on the security and defence front, 
in other areas he saw closer links between Britain and the continent, while the Americans still saw 
Britain as their closest ally within Europe on all fronts. These problems had never really surfaced until 
the Year of Europe, because the Americans had been focussing their foreign policy efforts on other 
areas, and also, which might even be of more importance, Kissinger did not yet wield the same 
amount of power that he slowly assumed during 1973. The loss of face caused by the Watergate 
scandal for nearly the entire Nixon administration had caused him, as one of the few that remained 
relatively unscathed by the entire ordeal, to come into way more power than any of his 
predecessors. In many respects he would prove to be a capable handler of foreign policy, his 
achievements are well documented. But there is also the clear failure of the Year of Europe, the 
complaints from allied leaders that his diplomacy was more suited for adversaries and his, by his own 
admission, lousy preparation for the Year of Europe. Kissinger obviously took the scale of his own 
initiative too lightly and also thought the relationship between the Europeans and Americans to be 
very comparable to that of immediately after the Second World War, while it obviously was not. He 
expected the Europeans to jump into line straight away and that they together could revive the 
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Atlantic Alliance to what it once had been. He seemed to be completely overlooking the fact that 
Europe and especially the European Community was going through a vital face in the creating of her 
own identity, and that for the first time since the war, they felt secure enough to stand on their own 
legs. This newfound confidence combined with Kissinger’s manner of dealing with the Europeans, 
which bordered on arrogance, was not helpful for the entire initiative.  
 For this entire year, Britain seems to have taken a sort of position in the middle. Heath was 
obviously oriented on the Europeans, but the pro-American stance of the FCO, and especially its 
secretary Alec Douglas-Home, acted as a kind of counterbalance. Douglas-Home was much more 
ingrained in the old ways of British politics, he saw the relationship with the United States as vital 
and tried his hardest to keep the old ‘special’ relationship the way it was. These men were two of the 
most important players on the British foreign policy front in this period. Together with the British 
ambassador in Washington, they were responsible for handling the Year of Europe initiative, as well 
as the role Britain took on in the European Community. And since Heath was in the end the man in 
charge, emphasis would lay on the EC instead of America. This was the way in which he as Prime 
Minister could make British foreign policy – at least officially – take such a drastic shift in comparison 
with the years before he became Prime Minister. This is one on the biggest impacts he would have as 
an individual. Of course, Douglas-Home still continued very close relations with the Americans, and 
the FCO continued to negotiate with the Americans on various issues throughout the year, but in the 
end his allegiance would have to lie with his Prime Minister and not with his own objectives. Douglas-
Home would have to go to the ministerial meetings in the EC and would have to negotiate with the 
others in the Nine on the handling of the Year of Europe initiative. And when through French 
pressures the bi-lateral consultations with the Americans had to be put on the backburner, he had no 
choice but to comply with these new rules.  
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Heath in 1973 
However, Heath could obviously not let the relationship with the Americans go completely to waste. 
He realised that their support was of importance, and that their troop presence in Western Europe 
was still a major deterrent for Soviet aspirations for Europe. You would therefore never hear Heath 
be as vocal about American military presence in Europe or about NATO as the French were, even 
though it’s very easy to claim that Heath had the same feeling about  the position of Britain in the 
world as the almost Gaullist vision for France Pompidou and Jobert had. They all had a certain kind of 
pride and wanted to restore their countries to the status they had had for so long, that of great 
powers, and all saw the EC as the way to do this. Heath therefore above all wanted to prove that the 
British belonged in Europe, especially to the French, who still saw the British as pawns of the 
Americans, even though that feeling had subsided at least a little since the absolute depths in 
twentieth century Franco-British relations during the reign of de Gaulle and the time of the Nassau 
agreements.202 Appeasing the French was not a task that was as easy as it sounded. They were quite 
dismissive of the entire initiative and dragged their heels at nearly every occasion provided to them. 
Whether they were actually opposed to the renewing of the Atlantic relations, or whether they just 
saw this as an opportunity to test the British and their European partners’ support of the European 
cause is doubtful. The memo that Beers quotes suggests the second, but this did not get written until 
half-way through the year. More likely is that they were as baffled by the sudden American initiative 
as the rest of their European partners, the British included.  
 Heaths role during the Year of Europe in essence boiled down to two things: convincing the 
French and especially Jobert that he was very committed to the European Community, while at the 
                                                             
202 De Gaulle (Prime minister of France between 1959 and 1962) had always seen British entry as a Trojan 
Horse for the Americanization of the EC. The Nassau agreements between the British and the Americans, under 
which Polaris nuclear missiles were supplied to the British by the Americans in October 1962 only deepened 
this resentment towards the British de Gaulle had. Note from the French Permanent Delegation to NATO (Paris, 
26 December 1962). For an example of the French reasoning and questioning of these agreements see:  
Ministère des Affaires étrangères,  ‘Note de la Délégation permanente de la France auprès de l'O.T.A.N.’, 
Commission de Publication des DDF (Ed.). Documents diplomatiques français, Book II: 1962, 1er juillet-31 
décembre (Paris 1999), pp. 588-590, consulted on: 
http://www.ena.lu/note_french_permanent_delegation_nato_paris_26_december_1962-2-7602. 
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same time convincing the Americans and especially Kissinger that he was still committed to the 
Atlantic Alliance, that he was willing to work with the Americans on redefining the Atlantic 
relationship. It seems that normally he would have had no problem with convincing either party that 
this was the case, but because both things had to be done at the same time he got stuck in a near 
impossible situation. Both ideals were seen to be diametrically opposed to each other, and while 
they were both important issues for Heath, he could not handle both at the same time. He had to 
choose, and he decided that at this time, the Europeans were more important. It is easy to blame 
Kissinger’s speech and bad preparation for this, and while this surely was of importance in the 
decision making process, the pre-existing preference Heath had for a close link between England and 
the continent was the bigger factor. He left the Year of Europe initiative and the dealings with the 
Americans to his FCO, while he focussed on the Europeans, which was, at least for him, priority 
number one. This choice led to a troublesome period in the American-European relations, especially 
after the French had objected to any kind of high-level steering group and had also objected to 
British bi-lateral talks with the Americans. Even though very little progress was made on the 
declaration before these events, after them it got even slower. Europe first had to find out how they 
would deal with the Americans before they could start to figure out what they were going to say. 
Tensions rose on both sides of the Atlantic, Kissinger’s ‘hostile’ form of diplomacy not being very 
helpful either, and just when things looked like they could not get any worse, the Middle-East crisis 
broke out. And after that, relations did not fully recover until next year, after the leaders of the three 
bigger European countries had left office, and had been replaced by pro-Atlanticist leaders. 
 From this thesis you can easily draw the conclusion that had Heath not been such a big 
supporter of European integration, had he followed the line most British Prime Ministers before and 
after him had taken, the one of the ‘special’ relationship with America, the initiative would’ve ended 
in a completely different way. If he had taken a much stronger stance on the Atlantic Relationship 
and had supported Kissinger’s initiative from the get-go, there is a big chance that this support within 
Europe would actually have led to a strong declaration and revival of the Atlantic Alliance. France 
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would’ve been alone within Europe in their opposition to the initiative, and more importantly, 
Kissinger would now have a staunch ally in Europe, who could’ve kept him up to date of negotiations 
and issues within Europe. Since the other nations in the Nine were either pre-occupied (Western – 
Germany) or not of much significance (the other six), the initiative boiled down to the response of 
the French and the British anyway. Had Heath supported the Americans, instead of trying to prove 
himself to the French, there is a big chance that the initiative would have actually gotten a footing in 
Europe, instead of the actual situation where it was basically kept out of Europe through French 
action and British in-action.  
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